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⑥ JAPANESE STUDIES ON MANCHURIA

Volume XI, Part 3.

Book A.

SMALL WARS AND BORDER PROBLEMS,  
THE CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT.

⑪ 9 July 1956

US ARMY INFANTRY HUMAN RESEARCH UNIT  
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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

Part 1 of Volume XI in the series of Japanese Studies on Manchuria deals with border problems, clashes, and policies; Part 2 with border garrisons and fortifications. Book A, Part 3 of Volume XI covers the Changkufeng Incident, while the Nomonhan Incident is presented as Books B and C.

The original account of the Changkufeng Incident was received from the Information and Historical Records Branch of the First Demobilization Bureau in October 1955. Subsequently, this brief version was supplemented by information contained in the official Japanese Army General Staff history of Changkufeng (8 Oct 43), one of the few Japanese operational documents which survived World War II.

Information contained in the original manuscripts was uneven in quality and emphasis and was marked by certain gaps and incompleteness. The editor has attempted to remedy these defects and retain the literary flavor of the Japanese authors within a more coherent and understandable whole. Subjective value judgments of the authors are also retained from the original, as the series of studies are Japanese, under American historical editorship. Footnotes and documentation have been provided by the editor where they appear necessary, to explain, amplify, or correct statements made in the text.

Three formerly high-ranking officers of the Japanese Army generously provided hitherto unavailable data concerning their personal participation in the Changkufeng Incident:

Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, Chief of Staff, Korea Army  
Lt. Gen. Kotoku Sato, CO, 75th Infantry Regiment  
Col. Sutezo Morita, CO, 2d Armored Train Unit

Acknowledgement is also made for assistance rendered the editor by: Mr. J. Bassin, Special Assistant, American Embassy, Tokyo; Mr. B. B. Blakeney, formerly counsel with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; as well as the 500th Military Intelligence Group and the AFPE Map Services.

Former-Col. Muraji Yano, a senior consultant with the Japanese Research Division, has completely redrawn all maps and has provided valuable assistance throughout the editing of this study.

9 July 1956

# Japanese Studies on Manchuria

## Volume XI

### Part 3

### Book A

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CHAPTER 1  
PRELUDE TO CHANKUFENG INCIDENT

Background

By the Conventions of Peiping (1860) the Chinese Empire ceded to Czarist Russia the entire Maritime Province of Siberia. (See Appendix A). Demarcation of the "lands to the east of the Ussuri" remained vague, however, and by the terms of the Lake Hanka Border Pact (1861), maps were drawn and markers were erected to define clear border lines between Russian and Chinese territory. From the very beginning, the map markings were often unclear or ambiguous, and the wooden boundary posts rotted away as the years went by. In 1886 a Russo-Chinese border commission worked out a "definitive" demarcation of the eastern borders, and the agreement was incorporated into the Hunchun Border Protocol of the same year (see Line "A," Map No. 1. The full text of this agreement is presented in Appendix B.)<sup>1</sup>

In 1909 the Chinese military authorities drew up and issued maps of the region. The Russian Army General Staff also published maps on a scale of 1:84,000. Both the Chinese and the Russian maps generally set the line of demarcation along the watershed (see Line

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1. Also see Chapter 1, Footnote 10, in Part 1 of the present study. - Ed.




"C," Map No. 1). No intergovernmental treaties or agreements backed up the military cartographic boundaries, issued some twenty-five years after the Hunchun Protocol.

Sometime between 1915 and 1920, the Chinese Army Survey Bureau for the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) issued still another map, which indicated a border line considerably to the west of the 1909 and 1911 maps, and much closer to the Hunchun line (see Line "B," Map No. 1). Once again, no official governmental agreement sanctioned the latest cartographical delimitation of the frontiers.

The Hunchun Protocol of 1886 thus continued to remain in force as the only intergovernmental pact which dealt with border delineation. There were, nevertheless, quite a few places where the actual site of the border posts differed from the map markings. In addition, many of the markers which had been erected in the 1880's were either destroyed or removed with the passage of time, and it became extremely difficult to determine where the precise boundaries extended.

In order to avoid possible border incidents with the U.S.S.R., the Commanding General, Korea Army, in March 1936 distributed maps to all subordinate units of his command, indicating which sectors lacked definitive demarcation. The commander warned all Japanese troops, down to patrols, against entering regions where clear border lines had not been established.

# MAP NO. 1



# MAP NO. 2



### Orders of Battle

In addition to his responsibility for the defense of all of Korea, the Commanding General, Korea Army, was also charged with defending Chientao, the southeasternmost province of Manchukuo. In January 1938, however, the mission of defending Chientao Province was turned over to the Kwantung Army, which activated the Hunchun Garrison Unit for that purpose. The responsibility for protecting Japanese nationals in Chientao Province nevertheless continued to rest with the Korea Army. Moreover, the Korea Army was assigned defensive responsibility south of a line connecting Hsinasan and Shangchiaoshan, along the borders between Manchuria, Korea, and the Soviet Union, in accordance with the annual operational guide issued by the Japanese Army General Staff. (See Maps No. 1 and 3).

The defense of North Korea was assigned to the 19th Division, with headquarters at Nanam. (See Fig. 1). Subordinate units were deployed as follows (see Map No. 4):

Hoeryong:	75th Inf Regt 19th Engr Regt
Nanam :	38th Inf Brig 73d Inf Regt 76th Inf Regt 27th Cav Regt 25th Mt Arty Regt 19th Trans Regt
Hamhung :	37th Inf Brig 74th Inf Regt

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
The 19th Division organized a Border Garrison Unit composed of two companies drawn from an increase in strength authorized for the 76th Infantry Regiment. The Border Garrison Unit was stationed in the forward zone opposite the Soviet Union, with one of its companies based upon Kouptong, and the other upon Kyonghun. Elements of the BGU were deployed for patrol duty along the borders.

Defense of the frontiers of Chientao Province north of Shanchiaoshan was entrusted to the Kwantung Army's Hunchun Garrison Unit, which was built around two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion, and was under the command of Maj. Gen. Yokoyama. The bulk of the garrison unit was stationed at Hunchun, while large elements consisting of one infantry battalion and a mountain artillery battery were deployed near Tumentsu; other detachments patrolled the border line. A Kwantung Army Special Service Agency was stationed in Hunchun itself. (See Map No. 3).

In addition to the Japanese troops, there were five companies of Manchukuoan police stationed in Chientao Province, one each at Wuchiatsu, Erhtachotzu, Nanpiehli, Tunghsingchen, and Hunchun. Elements from each police company were dispatched for frontier guard duty.

Within Manchuria itself, the Kwantung Army disposed of the following troop strength:

MAP NO. 3



MAP NO. 4





FIGURE 1





<u>Division</u>	<u>Sector</u>
12th	Tungning, Suifenho, and Shiao-suifen River
8th	Mutanchiang
2d	Harbin
1st	Sunwu
7th	Tsitsihar
23d	Hailar

Facing the Korea Army and the Hunchun Garrison Unit was the Soviet Army's 59th Border Garrison Unit (Hq: Posyet). The Russians' 40th Infantry Division (Hq: Slavyanka) was, in turn, deployed behind the 59th BGU. According to contemporary Japanese intelligence data, the Soviet 32d Division (Hq: Razvolnoye) also participated in the fighting at Changkufeng. The Soviet 92d Division (Hq: Barabash) may likewise have fought at Changkufeng.<sup>2</sup> (See Map No. 3).

It is now known that, between 1937 and 1942, the Soviets' 59th Border Guard Unit, known also as the Khassan (Hasan) or Posyet BGU, was commanded by then-Col. K. Y. Grebennik. According to this Soviet officer, the 59th BGU was responsible for guarding 236 kms. of land frontier as well as 400 kms. of seashore. Soviet border outposts at

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2. Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Map No. 1. - Ed.

Podgornaya and Paksikori had responsibility for the defense of the frontiers west of Lake Hasan. The eastern slopes of Changkufeng were reportedly "always guarded" by Soviet troops.<sup>3</sup>

#### IGHQ Considerations

The Wuhan Operation<sup>4</sup> of the Japanese Army was in full swing in China during 1938, and the Japanese military authorities therefore made every effort to prevent the outbreak of incidents with the U.S.S.R. Gen. Hashimoto, Chief of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff, has stated that the "sudden" outbreak of the Changkufeng Incident threw the High Command into a "state of deep anxiety:"

At that time [1937-38], military power was short, as well as munitions, to continue large-scale operations against China. It was impossible...to pour our whole strength into operations against China as we were faced with the necessity of preparing against the menace of Soviet Russia.

The Russian military force in the Far East, which had been increasingly strengthened since the Manchurian Incident, was a great menace to Japan, against which our Supreme Command exhausted its wits in thinking out countermeasures. ...At the time of the Changkufeng Incident, most of our forces were concentrated [in China], leaving only 6 divisions in Manchuria against

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3. Record of Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 26 Jan 48, pp. 38,284-318. Hereafter cited as IMTFE, Transcript. - Ed.

4. The drive which was to capture the Central Chinese cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow. See Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record (1937-1941), Chapter 2. - Ed.

more than 20 divisions of the Russian Far Eastern forces.<sup>5</sup>

#### Japanese Forces Committed

The following Japanese ground units were eventually committed to the fighting at Changkufeng (authorized peacetime personnel strengths in parentheses):

19th Div  
Hq (159)  
Sig Unit (108), composed of 2 wire and 1 wireless plats

37th Inf Brig  
Hq (30)  
73d & 74th Inf Regts (aprx. 1,200-1,500 each)

38th Inf Brig  
Hq (30)  
75th & 76th Inf Regts (aprx. 1,500 each)<sup>6</sup>

BGU, 76th Inf Regt (292)  
2 hq cos; 1 prov plat; 1st Co (118); 2d Co (101)

25th Mt Arty Regt (609)  
Hq; 3 bns, ea consisting of hq & two 2-plat btries  
Equipped with twenty-four 75-mm. pack guns

---

5. IMTFE, Transcript, 20 May 47, pp. 22,582, 22,586, 22,592-93. - Ed.

6. According to JRD Monograph entitled Japanese Night Combat, Part 3, p. 483, the 75th Inf Regt comprised the following troop strength as of 30 July 1938: Regtl Hq (67); 1st Bn (393); 2d Bn (390); 3d Bn (384); Regtl Gun Unit (88); AT Gun Unit (53). Total (1,375). Figures exclude Medical, Veterinary, Intendence, and Ordnance personnel. - Ed.

15th Hv FA Regt (213)  
 Hq; 2 btries  
 Equipped with eight 15-cm. howitzers

19th Engr Regt (233)  
 3 cos

1st Indep Mixed Brig Arty Unit (449)  
 Equipped with eight Type 90 field guns

Indep Hv Arty Btry (145)  
 Equipped with two Type 89 15-cm. cannon

2d Armd Train Unit (202)  
 Equipped with two 10-cm. and two 7-cm.  
 AA guns

In general, the organization of Japanese Army forces committed to the combat at Changkufeng conformed to the following peacetime tables of organization:

Inf Regt: Hq  
 Three bns  
 One inf gun co  
 One AT gun co

Bn : Hq  
 Three rifle cos  
 One MG co  
 One inf gun plat

Co : Two plats totalling 90-100 pers

By the time of the ceasefire on 11 August 1938, the Japanese had committed 12 infantry battalions to the fighting at Changkufeng. The infantry personnel strength is estimated at 8,000; the artillery, at 1,000. These forces included about 2,000 troop reinforcements sent from the Kwantung Army and placed under the operational control

of the Korea Army.

From a strength of two cannon at the outbreak of the Changkufeng Incident, Japanese artillery forces were built up to 14 guns by 31 July, and 37 guns by 11 August. Under the operational command of the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, all Japanese forward artillery units were committed and engaged, firing from west of the Tumen River.<sup>7</sup>

#### Soviet Forces Committed

As of 31 July 1938, according to the commander of the Soviet 59th BGU, he had the following forces under his operational control in the locale of the front-line fighting at Changkufeng:

92 border guard soldiers (reinforced from only three guards on 1 July);

One Soviet Army infantry company (arrived 0300, 31 July, from direction of Zarechye, 10-12 kms. away);

One platoon of three tanks (arrived with rifle company).<sup>8</sup>

The Red Army General Staff's Journal of Battle Actions for 31 July 1938 identifies the following units:

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7. Troop and artillery strengths based upon evidence of then-Col. Ryukichi Tanaka, CO, 25th Mt Arty Regt; IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 47, p. 22,718; ibid., 22 May 47, pp. 22,746-47. - Ed.

8. Ibid., 26 Jan 48, pp. 38,284-318. - Ed.

One company, 118th Rifle Regiment, with attached tanks (operating from direction of Podgornaya);

(?) battalions, 119th Rifle Regiment, with tank company (occupying Hill 68.8).<sup>9</sup>

Contemporary Japanese estimates of the numbers of Soviet troops and equipment committed to the Changkufeng Incident during the August phases are depicted in Table 1. According to later Japanese intelligence reports, the Soviets committed a total of three infantry divisions,<sup>10</sup> one cavalry division, and one brigade of artillery, while holding three more infantry divisions in reserve. (See Orders of Battle, above). From interrogations of about a dozen Soviet prisoners captured at Changkufeng, the Japanese judged the total Russian troop strength to have been perhaps 30,000. The Soviet Army was believed to have committed 120 pieces of artillery.<sup>11</sup>

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9. Ibid., 15 Oct 46, pp. 7,814-15. - Ed.

10. During a personal interview with the editor, conducted at Hikone, Japan, on 22 Aug 54, the Chief of Staff of the Korea Army at the time of the Changkufeng Incident--Maj. Gen. Kenzo Kitano--confirmed contemporary Japanese intelligence estimates that the Soviets committed nine (triangular) regiments at Changkufeng. See Table 1. - Ed.

11. Intelligence and prisoner-of-war data derived from statements of then-Col. Ryukichi Tanaka, CO, 25th Mt Arty Regt; IMTFB, Transcript, 22 May 47, pp. 22,747, 22,756, 22,758. - Ed.

Table 1

Japanese Intelligence Estimates  
of Soviet Ground Strength  
(Changkufeng, August 1938)

Date & Hour	Soviet Front-line Forces		
	Inf Bns	Arty Pieces	Tanks
3 Aug (1700)	10	40	80
6 Aug (2000)	19	70	200
7 Aug (1800)	25	80	200
8 Aug (2000)	27	80	Very few at front
9 Aug (2200)	27	100	Very few at front
10 Aug (1800)	27	100	None seen at front
11 Aug (1200)	27	100	20 at front; others withdrawn to northeast

## Political and Strategic Summary<sup>12</sup>

The Korea Army notified Imperial General Headquarters that Soviet troops had occupied Changkufeng Hill on 11 July 1938, and that the trespassers were engaged in the construction of field works there. On 14 July, IGHQ decided to settle the matter through diplomatic negotiations, and requested the Foreign Ministry to lodge a protest with the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> At 9 P.M. the same day, Foreign Minister Ugaki wired a protest for delivery by Haruhiko Nishi, the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in Moscow.<sup>14</sup>

On 15 July, Nishi requested the Soviet authorities<sup>15</sup> to withdraw their troops from the disputed locale immediately. The Soviet Foreign Office remained adamant, claiming that the Changkufeng area lay within Russian territory, according to maps attached to the Hunchun Protocol of 1886.

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12. Extracts from IGHQ orders concerning the Changkufeng Incident are presented in Appendix C, Items 1-13.

13. Contemporary Japanese leaders included Prince Konoye (Prime Minister), Gen. Itagaki (War Minister), Gen. Ugaki (Foreign Minister), Prince Kanin (Chief of Army General Staff), Lt. Gen. Shun Tada (Deputy C/S), Maj. Gen. Gun Hashimoto (Chief, 1st Bureau), and Col. Masazumi Inada (Chief, Operations Section). - Ed.

14. IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 47, p. 22,923. - Ed.

15. Nishi saw Stomonyakov, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs. - Ed.



To cope with any possible aggravation of the situation, IGHQ issued orders to the commander of the Korea Army, on 16 July:

The Commanding General, Korea Army, may concentrate units in Korea near the border, as necessary, against illegal border trespasses by Soviet forces in the vicinity of Changkufeng. Resort to force, however, may be taken only upon receipt of orders from IGHQ.<sup>16</sup>

Simultaneously, IGHQ issued a directive that "any action liable to cause aerial combat will be strictly avoided." In accordance with the communications received from IGHQ, the Commanding General, Korea Army, concentrated forces principally composed of four infantry battalions and two mountain artillery battalions behind the frontiers. By 19 July, concentration was completed in the Shikukai, Kyonghun, and Agochi sectors. (See Map No. 2 and Fig. 2).

After study, the Korea Army commander (Lt. Gen. Kotaro Nakamura) reached the following conclusions and recommendations, which he forwarded to IGHQ on 20 July:

In view of the enemy situation, delay will render it more difficult for our forces to launch an attack. If no hope lies in diplomatic negotiations, military action should be taken in order to repulse the enemy.

The Japanese Military Attache [Col. Yujin Kawamata] stationed

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16. A variant translation is given in Appendix C-1. - Ed.

in Moscow also submitted his opinion:

The U.S.S.R. is taking a strong stand because Japan is involved in the China Incident, and also because of domestic considerations on the part of the Soviet Foreign Office. It should therefore be concluded that the Soviet Union has no intention of commencing war. [Japanese] propaganda activities should be intensively carried out at home and abroad, and the enemy forces immediately repulsed.

IGHQ, however, had to take into account both the domestic and the foreign situation, and consequently did not accept the recommendations received from the Commanding General, Korea Army, and from the Military Attache in Moscow. Ambassador Mamoru Shigemitsu had been on an official business trip in Europe when, "in view of the gravity of the situation," he received telegraphed orders to return to his post immediately.<sup>17</sup> He arrived in Moscow on 18 July, and two days later called upon Foreign Commissar Litvinov and demanded a restoration of the status quo ante as of 11 July; the Soviets flatly refused.


On 26 July, IGHQ directed that Korea Army forces concentrated in the border regions now return to their original duty stations. At the same time, the Japanese Government wired Ambassador Shigemitsu that "it has been decided to stay on the alert and to watch Soviet movements for a while."

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17. IMTFE, Transcript, 23 May 47, p. 22,918. - Ed.

FIGURE 2

FORCES CONCENTRATED  
IN SHIKUKAI, KYONGHUN, AND AGOCHI SECTORS  
(19 JULY 1938)



 INFANTRY REGIMENTAL GUN

Japanese troops concentrated near the borders began their withdrawal. The Commanding General of the 19th Division did not, however, pull back two infantry battalions, one mountain artillery battery, and two engineer platoons, but placed these forces under the command of Lt. Col. Senda's border garrison unit. The division commander also remained in the forward area.

A new incident broke out on 29 July, when several Soviet soldiers moved up to the top of the high ground south of Shachaofeng and started construction work. Japanese troops drove off the intruders. After hearing of the Shachaofeng affair, IGHQ determined to maintain its policy of preventing enlargement of the incident, and to count upon its settlement by the forces on the spot. (See Situation Map No. 5, 30 July).

On 31 July, front-line Japanese troops pushed back Soviet forces from the hill line between Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, and proceeded to occupy the forward positions. Upon receipt of this news, on 1 August, the Japanese Government held a Five-Ministers' Conference<sup>18</sup> at which the following policies were determined:

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18. Four of these ministers held the portfolios for War, Navy, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. The Premier was the fifth member of the Conference. - Ed.

1. Enlargement of the incident will be prevented, in so far as possible; diplomatic negotiations will be conducted to settle the affair along localized lines.

2. No further military action will be undertaken unless the Soviet forces act provocatively.

3. In case the negotiations fail, present conditions will be maintained.

The Japanese Minister of War, Gen. Itagaki, states that a Cabinet meeting was held on 2 August, the day after Soviet aircraft "attacked deep into Korean territory simultaneously with attacks from the ground."

This caused us [continues Gen. Itagaki] to entertain very serious doubts as to whether or not Russia had positive intentions in connection with the affair. Generally, two points were decided at that cabinet meeting. The first point was localization of the incident and speedy local settlement of the issue; that is, non-expansion and aggravation of the incident on the spot. The second point of the policy decided was to transfer the matter to diplomatic negotiations with a view to effecting a speedy settlement of the incident, and the army attitude thereon was that it would make every effort to effect a local settlement of the issue even though Japan may have to withdraw from the line which the U.S.S.R. claimed to be the frontier in the vicinity of Changkufeng.<sup>19</sup>

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19. IMTFE, Transcript, 8 Oct 47, p. 30,332. - Ed.

# MAP NO. 5




FIGURE 3





FIGURE 4




IGHQ promptly issued orders on 1 August to the effect that the Korea Army should secure areas currently occupied. Telegraphed directives also stated that the use of aircraft was prohibited, except in the case of self-defense.

Korea Army forces which had been ordered to pull back from the frontiers had already commenced their withdrawal but, after the outbreak of the Shachacfeng Incident, the 19th Division Commander countermanded these orders. Fearing the worst, he now ordered those units which were pulling back, to reverse themselves; and other units which had already returned to their duty stations, to move back toward the forward zone. Already, on 31 July, the Division Commander had requested authorization to deploy divisional elements in the forward zone (see Fig. 3), in order to be able to cope with eventualities, but Korea Army Headquarters had not acceded to Lt. Gen. Suetaka's earnest desire. The Chief of Staff of the Korea Army [Maj. Gen. Kenzo Kitano] immediately set out to inspect the situation on the spot, however, and on 1 August, Army Headquarters sanctioned concentration by the 19th Division of four infantry battalion and one mountain artillery battalion behind the border.

For three days, commencing on 1 August, enemy forces launched assaults in an unsuccessful effort to recapture the ground which they had lost during the Shachacfeng Incident and during the Japanese night attack on 31 July. (See Situation Map No. 6, 2 August).



# MAP NO.6



After two further days of preparation (4-5 August), the Russians resumed their attacks on the 6th. Although often endangered, Japanese forces put up stiff resistance and clung to their positions, despite being far inferior to the Soviets in ground strength and totally lacking in air support. (See Situation Map No. 7, 6 August). By about the 8th of August, Japanese casualties had mounted greatly as a result of Soviet artillery barrages, air bombardment, and hand grenade attacks. There were signs of growing demoralization, and it appeared almost impossible to defend the positions any longer.

Because of the weak force of Japanese artillery committed at Changkufeng, IGHQ on 5 August ordered the Kwantung Army to dispatch two batteries of Type 90 field guns, one battery of 15-cm. cannon, and one armored train unit. On 8 August the 20th Depot Division (headquarters in Seoul) sent up replacement troops. Two days later, one independent machine gun battalion, one heavy field artillery regiment, and four field antiaircraft artillery units were ordered to the front.<sup>20</sup> The emergency mobilization of the 19th Division was also ordered on 10 August.

Generally speaking, the borders facing the Kwantung Army remained quiet during the fighting at Changkufeng. On 5 August, however, reports were received that several Soviet soldiers had

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20. Unit designations were as follows: 6th Indep MG Bn; 2d Hvy FA Regt; 6th Field AA Unit (1st Div), 20th Div Field AA Unit, and 7th, 8th Field AA Units (Kwantung Army). - Ed.

crossed the frontier and had begun construction of field works on a hill northeast of Nantienshan, in the Suifenhö area. Local forces drove off the Russians.

Meanwhile, in an effort to relieve the Soviet pressure upon the Korea Army in the Changkufeng area, and to strengthen military preparedness against the U.S.S.R., the Kwantung Army ordered the following redeployment of troop strength in early August:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>New Station</u>
7th Div <sup>21</sup>	South of Hsiao-suifen River
2d Div	Between Hsilingho and Muleng
3d Inf Regt (1st Div)	Vicinity of Shengwutun (50 kms. south of Aihun)

In addition, IG<sup>22</sup> ordered the 104th Division to move to the vicinity of Hunchun. This division was in South Manchuria en route to South China, when it was ordered to the Hunchun sector on 9 August. Then-Maj. Gen. Gun Hashimoto, Chief of the 1st Bureau (Operations) of the General Staff during the Changkufeng Incident, states: "Taking into consideration the offensive attitude of the Soviet Union, we retained in Manchuria, under the direct command of the central authorities, for the time being, about one division which was on its

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21. This division was caught by a torrential downpour while bivouacked in valley country in Southeast Manchuria, somewhere in the Mulengwochi range south of Mutanchiang. The camp site had to be abandoned while all units sought refuge on high ground. - Ed.

# MAP NO. 7

130°20'

## SITUATION MAP, CHANGKUFENG

2000 HOURS, 6 AUGUST 1938

FORWARD POSITION  
SPEARHEAD



### ESTIMATE OF SOVIET FORCES

SOUTH OF MAANSHAN: TOTAL { 19 INF BNS  
70 ARTY PIECES  
100 TKS


(A) 3 INF BNS, 60 TKS

(B) 1 1/2 INF BNS, 15 TKS

(C) 4 INF BNS, 50 TKS

42°28'

42°28'



130°20'

way to China, in order to provide for a probable emergency."<sup>22</sup>

At a parley held in Tokyo on 4 August between Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Horinouchi and Charge d'Affaires Smetanin, the Soviet diplomat stated: "If the Japanese Army will suspend offensive operations, the fighting between the two parties will cease spontaneously." Smetanin had been called in by the Foreign Office because of the "very tense situation," which made it imperative to propose an immediate cessation of fighting as a matter of "utmost urgency."

Encouraged by the tenor of Smetanin's statement, the Foreign Office cabled details of the interview to Shigemitsu and instructed the Ambassador to "pursue concrete negotiations" for a ceasefire. The U.S.S.R., however, continued to insist that Japanese troops cease artillery fire and withdraw from Soviet territory. The Russians also laid down the prerequisites that Japanese forces must pull back to the line existing before 29 July; and that Japan must sanction the borders designated in the Hunchun Protocol of 1886. The Japanese Foreign Office nevertheless surmised from Shigemitsu's talk with Litvinov on 4 August that the Soviets "had a disposition to cease fighting, providing that conditions were satisfactory."<sup>23</sup>

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22. IMTFE, Transcript, 20 May 47, p. 22,589. - Ed.

23. Extracts from Report of 1st Section, Euro-Asiatic Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry (1938); ibid., 22 May 47, p. 22,935 ff.  
- Ed.

At another conference between Shigemitsu and Litvinov, on 7 August, the Russians still insisted upon the same conditions despite their apparent desire to localize the Changkufeng Incident. Finally, in a meeting on 10 August, Shigemitsu and Litvinov reached a basic agreement concerning the cessation of hostilities, to become effective at noon on 11 August.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 1



MAINICHI SHIMBUN PHOTO

VIEW OF CHIANGCHUNFENG (L) AND CHANGKUFENG (R), EAST FROM TUMEN RIVER

CHAPTER 2  
DEVELOPMENT OF CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT

On the Eve

On 6 July 1938, three Soviet horsemen appeared in the vicinity of Changkufeng, which they reconnoitered before withdrawing.<sup>1</sup> At 1120 hours, 9 July, outposts of the Japanese garrison unit at Koup-tong sighted about a dozen Russian soldiers at Changkufeng.<sup>2</sup> Two days later, some 40 Soviet troops could be seen constructing positions on the hill.<sup>3</sup> Gen. Gun Hashimoto, then operations bureau chief in the General Staff at Tokyo, says that "on 13 July we received a telegraphed report from the Korea Army to the effect that about 40 Soviet troops had crossed the frontier near Changchi [Lake Hasan] on 11 July and had occupied Changkufeng, [where they were] constructing positions."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Supplementary data from semiofficial Kaikosha Kiji (Army Officers' Journal), Sept. 1938, #768, p. 12. - Ed.

2. Japanese maps drawn up before 1938 showed the altitude of Changkufeng as 149 meters. After the incident, new surveys indicated a summit height of 157.5 m. Comparable figures for Chiangchunfeng are 147 m. (old reading) and 141.2 m. (new). See Photo 1. - Ed.

3. Japanese military reports of the inception of the Changkufeng Incident differ, as to date, from the contemporary Foreign Ministry account. The latter states that 10-odd Soviet soldiers first appeared on 11 (not 9) July; and that the number reached 40 by the 14th (not 11th). All other details are in accord. IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 47, p. 22,923. - Ed.

4. Ibid., 20 May 47, p. 22,586. - Ed.



When Col. Ryukichi Tanaka, commanding the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, observed Changkufeng Hill on 16 July, he saw Soviet trenches about 20 or 30 meters below the summit, on the western slopes, which the Japanese always claimed lay in Manchukuoan territory. One row of barbed wire had been strung just below the trenches. The barricades were increased gradually until, by the 29th, there were three rows of wire entanglements, the lowest about 100 meters below the summit of the western slope. These observations were made with 12-power artillery binoculars, at a range of about two kilometers from the west bank of the Tumen River.<sup>5</sup>

The commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment, Col. Kotoku Sato, arrived at Haigan Station, west of Agochi, on 17 July. It was his intention to determine whether enemy troops had penetrated into Manchukuoan territory, and to conduct an on-the-spot inspection of the terrain. On the 18th, Col. Sato and several engineer officers donned white Korean civilian garb, and went by oxcart from Koup-tong southward along the Tumen River bank, opposite Changkufeng. The disguised party studied the area, noting river-crossing sites. Wire entanglements, trenches, and some Soviet soldiers could be clearly seen on the west slope of Changkufeng. No Korean natives were in evidence, although it had always been customary for them to

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5. Ibid., 21 May 47, pp. 22,716-17; ibid., 22 May 47, p. 22,752.  
- Ed.

conduct religious rites on the hill in summer.<sup>6</sup>

The Japanese military testimony is corroborated by that of a Japanese consular police officer operating from Hunchun. After returning to Kyonghun on 24 July, this officer stated that he had been observing Changkufeng from Sozan (in Korea), and that the Soviets had set up barbed wire entanglements about 20-30 meters below the summit. On 20 July, he had personally seen (from Koup-tong) that the Russians were manning trenches which they had dug. The summit positions were camouflaged with grass and trees.<sup>7</sup> On 28 July, a Japanese Foreign Ministry observer visited a platoon of the 27th Cavalry Regiment at Sozan, on the Korean shore of the Tumen River. From this point, Changkufeng could be clearly viewed, and the observer reported that he could see Soviet troops on the western slopes, "below the summit, digging trenches and driving /stakes/;

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6. Editorial interview with Lt. Gen. Kotoku Sato; Tokyo, 26 Jun 56. Hereafter cited as Sato Interview. - Ed.

7. Kazuichi Miura (Chief, 3d Section, Research Bureau, Foreign Ministry), quoting from contemporary report of Mitsuru Terao, the police officer mentioned in text, above. IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 47, pp. 22,898-99. - Ed.

a red flag ~~[was]~~ flying near the top of the hill."<sup>8</sup>

#### New Commander

A routine changeover in the command of the Korea Army occurred on 15 July, when Lt. Gen. Kotaro Nakamura replaced Lt. Gen. Kuniaki Koiso. Upon receipt of the report concerning initial developments at Changkufeng, Gen. Koiso took no immediate counteraction. The new commander, Gen. Nakamura, ordered the emergency dispatch of troops to the Changkufeng area only after receiving instructions therefor from IGHQ on 16 July (see Appendix C-1). Outgoing commander Koiso has explained developments in mid-July 1938 as follows:

...in view of the movement of Soviet troops in the vicinity of Changkufeng, the commander of the 19th Division, first of all, had taken precautionary measures on the bank of the Tumen River by stationing a part of the divisional strength there. Then, in order to enable the taking of appropriate and corresponding defensive measures in the face of changes that might take place in the situation in the future,

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8. Testimony of Miura (see preceding footnote); *ibid.*, p. 22,896. The Soviet prosecution later derided this evidence, claiming that (1) Sozan (Sodzan), which is  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kms. away from Changkufeng, is too far for accurate visual observation; (2) it is considered "highly improbable that the ~~[Soviet]~~ frontier post, which was highly interested in camouflage, should have hoisted such a large flag." A Soviet witness (Batarshin) stated that the red flag was first hoisted at Changkufeng on the morning of 6 August, after Soviet Army regular troops drove the Japanese off the summit. *Ibid.*, 31 Oct 47, p. 32,149. - Ed.

[he] requested my permission as Army Commander, on 14 July 1938, to concentrate the main strength of the division on the bank of the Tumen River. Before giving any order, I immediately wired to the Chief of the General Staff and War Minister for instructions from...Tokyo. However, before receiving the reply to my inquiry, I received orders the next day, 15 July, transferring me to Tokyo. The telegram from the Chief of the General Staff in reply to my inquiry arrived 16 July, and was delivered to Gen. Nakamura, my successor.... I think that the new commander...disposed of this matter on the basis of the telegraphic instructions, as the order for concentration was not issued by me.<sup>9</sup>

Gen. Gun Hashimoto has shed light upon the contemporary views of IGHQ:

The Supreme Command thought this was only a small conflict [like] those usually occurring on the border line between Soviet Russia and Manchuria, but as the Korea Army was not used to dealing with such affairs and, besides, as we were fully occupied with the preparation of the Wuhan operation [in China], the Supreme Command did not want the incident to become aggravated. So it was decided to order the Korea Army to adopt a cautious attitude, and to settle the affair through regular diplomatic channels. This policy was telegraphed to the Korea Army.... I myself, when I saw [Gen. Nakamura] off on the morning of his departure from Haneda [Tokyo] air field, talked to him about the same principle again.<sup>10</sup>

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9. Ibid., 31 Oct 47, p. 32,233. - Ed.

10. Ibid., 20 May 47, pp. 22,586-87. - Ed.

### Troop Movements, 17-28 July

In accordance with orders from the Korea Army, the Commanding General, 19th Division (Lt. Gen. Kamezo Suetaka) dispatched the commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment (Col. Kotoku Sato) from Hoeryong to Changkufeng on 17 July. The forward movement of the following troops commenced the same day (see also Fig. 2):

- 75th Inf Regt
- Two cav plats (27th Cav Regt)
- 1st Bn, 76th Inf Regt
- 25th Mt Arty Regt (less 2d Bn)
- 15th Hv FA Regt
- 19th Engr Regt

Forces were concentrated by 19 July along the right bank of the Tumen River, in the Shikukai, Kyonghun, and Agochi sectors. Attack preparations were completed on the 20th, although the 75th Infantry Regiment was still ready to return promptly to its Hoeryong station if orders were received to that effect. Upon receipt of a message from Korea Army on 23 July, stipulating that force was not to be employed, the 19th Division Commander ordered his forces, which were readying for the attack, to pull back to rear assembly areas. The 75th Infantry Regiment left behind one platoon of the Kouptong Garrison Unit, southwest of Shachao-feng; and one infantry company, which had reached Chiangchun-feng on 21 July. The latter unit was placed under the command of the 76th Infantry Regiment BGU Commander (at Kouptong), and the 19th Engineer Regiment proceeded to remove its

pontoon ferries from the Tumen. In the view of the local commanders, the Changkufeng Incident was about over.<sup>11</sup>

Gen. Gun Hashimoto has described the subsequent IGHQ actions as follows:

The Supreme Command saw that the diplomatic negotiations were hanging fire and feared that, in the interval, the opposing forces might carelessly aggravate the conflict. IGHQ therefore decided to call back the peacetime units of the Korea Army to their original stations. Units which had been ordered to move up in emergency support of the border garrison forces were now recalled, and the High Command decided to watch developments quietly. Orders to this effect were issued on 26 July.<sup>12</sup>

On 27 July, the Korea Army Commander issued new orders, in accordance with the previously received directive from IGHQ, calling for the return of troops from the staging areas to their original duty stations. The following day, the 19th Division pulled back two cavalry platoons (2d Co, 27th Cav Regt) and the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment (less 7th Battery), while preparing to withdraw the remaining units. In the border area, however, the following detachments were ordered to remain in the assembly areas, and were placed under the command of the 76th Infantry Regiment's Border

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11. Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

12. IMTFE, Transcript, 16 Oct 46, p. 22,588. - Ed.

Garrison Unit (Lt. Col. Senda, CO):

3d Bn, 75th Inf Regt  
1st Bn, 76th Inf Regt  
7th Btry, 25th Mt Arty Regt  
Two plats, 19th Engr Regt

#### Shachaofeng Incident

At about 0930 hours on 29 July, several Soviet soldiers crossed the Manchukuoan border and commenced construction of positions on a hill south of Shachaofeng (see Situation Map No. 5, 30 July). The Commanding General of the 19th Division received this report from the Border Garrison Unit commander at 1100 hours, whereupon he ordered the BGU to attack and repulse the enemy forces, and to pull back thereafter. Gen. Suetaka took this action on his own initiative, in view of his concept of the divisional mission.

To counter a possible enemy counterattack, the 19th Division simultaneously reinforced the BGU with the 1st Battalion, 76th Infantry Regiment, and the regimental gun company, from Kyonghun. At Agochi, the units which had been preparing to fall back were now ordered forward, while the detachments which had already returned to their duty stations were sent up to the assembly areas.

In accordance with his instructions from the 19th Division, the BGU commander launched an attack at 1430 hours on the 29th against Soviet forces south of Shachaofeng. The BGU committed the 2d Infantry Company (about 90 men) from the force at Kouptong, plus one

infantry platoon (about 30 men) deployed at Chiangchunfeng. After the Russian detachment was destroyed, the Japanese assault force withdrew to the high ground southwest of the hamlet of Shachaofeng and regrouped at a point considered by the Japanese to be one kilometer behind the border line.

During the later afternoon, in heavy rain, the Soviets brought up reinforcements to the Shachaofeng area, until they had about 80 infantrymen and several tanks there by 1700 hours. According to the Japanese contention, the Russians were then 500 meters within Manchukuoan territory southwest of Shachaofeng.

Meanwhile, the Korea Army commander had dispatched carefully worded instructions to the 19th Division Commander:

Enemy forces attacking our troops on the hill southwest of Shachaofeng will be defeated. You ought to be satisfied, however, with driving them back across the borders, out of Manchukuoan territory.

If the enemy is still south of Shachaofeng hamlet (including the hill), you ought not to attack him. Take great care not to enlarge this conflict.<sup>13</sup>

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13. The original Japanese text of Gen. Nakamura's telegram of 29 July is marked by gracious phraseology, indicative of the Army Commander's great concern. Supplementary data based upon official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 1. - Ed.



### Soviet Version of Shachaofeng Incident

The Russians call the hill south of Shachaofeng, "Bezmyannaya," or "no-name hill." According to the Soviet contention, Bezmyannaya lay 250-300 meters behind the U.S.S.R. frontier, and was part of the sector guarded by the Podchikoriya border outpost, whereas Changkufeng was the responsibility of the Podgornaya detachment of NKVD troops. Concerning the Shachaofeng Incident, the official report to Moscow from the Posyet (59th) BGU stated that on 29 July 1938, at about 1600 hours, the Japanese struck in two groups against Bezmyannaya. There were 50 Japanese infantry, armed with a light machine gun, in the first party, while the second wave consisted of nearly one company equipped with light and heavy machine guns, and rifles. The Soviet frontier guard patrol "withdrew," while detachments from the Russian forces deployed at Changkufeng (Zaozernaya) moved up in support and skirmished with the Japanese. Observation was reportedly rendered difficult by "dense fog."<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet BGU commander, then-Col. K. Y. Grebennik, recounts a more detailed version of the action at Shachaofeng:<sup>15</sup>

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14. IMTFF, Transcript, 31 Oct 47, pp. 32,176-77; ibid., 30 Oct 47, pp. 32,138, 32,148. - Ed.

15. Ibid., 26 Jan 48, pp. 38,294-96. - Ed.

About 1600 hours on 29 July, from Zaozernaya Hill I heard the sounds of machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire, and grenade explosions in the vicinity of Bezmyannaya Hill. I received a message over the telephone that there appeared a Japanese unit of company size which had deployed into two groups and launched an attack on Bezmyannaya Hill, where there was a patrol of 11 border guards under Lt. Makhalin.

At first I could not personally observe matters, inasmuch as there was a fog which considerably reduced visibility, although the distance between the hills amounted to not more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  kms. But shortly thereafter the fog lifted somewhat, and I personally saw a platoon of the Japanese infantry which had crossed to our territory between the hills.

I ordered Sr. Lt. Ratnikov, who was attached to me with a group of border guards, to support Makhalin's patrol from the south, with a group of border guards from the Zaozernaya Hill outfit.... At the same time I ordered, over the telephone, that Sr. Lt. Bykhovtsev (CO of the Paksikori outpost) alert his outposts and use his entire personnel to support Makhalin's patrol, from the north.

It was at that time that I sent a telephone message to the regular Soviet Army authorities asking for support; being aware of the strength of the Japanese troops which had crossed the border, I felt that I would not be able to hold out against them with my own forces. As a result of this engagement, five border guards (including Lt. Makhalin) were killed, and the other six were wounded.

Due to the support of the groups under Ratnikov and Bykhovtsev, which had arrived in good season, the Japanese troops were repulsed from Bezmyannaya Hill, and our unit consolidated there.

Other Soviet accounts of participants amplify Col. Grebennik's statements. Maj. Batarshin (then a section leader 7 men of the 59th BGU), says:

From the eastern summit of Zaozernaya I could clearly see...the summit of No-Name Hill 700 meters away, and I personally saw how the Japanese concentrated their forces across the state border line, ...on their territory...and, using the ravines, approached closely.... That day there was a slight drizzle, but the hill was clearly seen in spite of this. There was no dense fog sic. I clearly saw the Japanese soldiers, their movements, and..how they waved the blades of their sabers and slashed our border guards.

The commander of our outpost watched the battle and sent me with four frontier guards to help. I took a light machine gun and approached the place of the battle. About 200 meters away, I opened fire, after which the Japanese started running toward their territory, leaving corpses and wounded frontier guards on the way.

From the site of the outpost of Zaozernaya, another group of Soviet border guards approached...and by joint flank movement we repulsed the Japanese troops from our territory.

All of the eleven Soviet frontier guards had fallen, unable to put up any resistance; whereas the Japanese, with blades drawn, had slashed the wounded and tried to drag some of them away to their territory. ... I found five corpses of our frontier guards,...and six others badly wounded.

I and my group had no casualties on the 29th. After the fighting, I reported back to Zaozernaya Hill.<sup>16</sup>

Then-Lt. P. F. Tereshkin, commander of the Soviet frontier guard outpost at Podgornaya (6-7 kms. from Changkufeng) says that as soon as the fighting began at Shachaofeng, he sent seven border guards to help (including Batarshin's detachment, mentioned above), from neighboring outposts. Upon the arrival of another unit of 30-40 Soviet cavalymen, states Tereshkin, the 100-150 Japanese troops retreated on the evening of the 29th.<sup>17</sup>

#### Actions of 30-31 July

On 29 July, the 75th Infantry Regiment (the last of the combat elements scheduled to return to their peacetime locations) was at Haigan, waiting to entrain for Hoeryong. At about 1600 hours, the regimental commander (Col. Sato) learned of the afternoon battle at Shachaofeng, whereupon he abandoned his intention of going to the train station, and recommended to the Division Commander that Hill

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16. Interrogation of Maj. G. A. Batarshin, conducted in Moscow on 26 Feb 46; text based upon ibid., 15 Oct 46, p. 7,812; ibid., 30 Oct 47, pp. 32,073, 32,120-21, 32,124. - Ed.

17. Interrogation of Lt. Col. P. F. Tereshkin, ibid., 15 Oct 46, pp. 7,776-77, 7,804-5. Also see, interrogation of Maj. I. D. Chernopyatko (then "Jr. Plat, Leader," an NCO rank), Moscow, 26 Feb 46, ibid., pp. 7,809-10; ibid., 31 Oct 47, pp. 32,155, 32,176, 32,178-79. - Ed.

52 be secured immediately. Upon receipt of authorization for such action, and of orders for the entire regiment to deploy across the Tumen River, Col. Sato directed all of his units to commence movement (1730 hours). At 2130 hours, one platoon of the 1st Battalion was ordered to occupy Hill 52, which it reached before dawn on 30 July.

The redeployment of the 75th Infantry Regiment took the 1st Battalion to Fangchuanting; the 3d Battalion to the sector west of Chiangchunfeng; and the 2d Battalion to Kyonghun, under the direct control of the division. Heavy rains, ferrying problems, and train delays slowed down the transfer of the regiment across the Tumen. The regimental commander had detrained at Shikukai, and had proceeded on foot to the banks of the Tumen, which he reached before dawn. By 0800 on 30 July the entire unit (minus the 2d Battalion) had got across at two points, with engineer support; previous reconnaissance of river-crossing sites proved highly effective.


On 30 July the 75th Infantry Regiment, whose command post was set up at Chiangchunfeng, was ordered to assume operational control over all Japanese forces east of the Tumen River. Col. Sato thus was in command of two infantry battalions, a 2-company border garrison unit, one-half of a mountain artillery battery, one heavy field artillery battery,<sup>18</sup> and one engineer regiment (see Fig. 5). The

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18. Only two 15-cm. howitzers (a half-battery) were actually supporting the 75th Infantry Regiment, from across the Tumen at Sozan. Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

FIGURE 5

FORCES COMMANDED BY 75TH  
INF REGT (30 JULY 1938)



 INFANTRY REGIMENTAL GUN

19th Division also ordered the 75th Infantry Regiment Commander to launch an immediate counterattack at an "opportune moment," as soon as an enemy assault was anticipated.

Japanese intelligence reports indicated that  $1\frac{1}{2}$  Soviet infantry battalions, supported by tanks, were deployed in the Shachaofeng area, readying for an attack. At Changkufeng, some 300 Russian troops were also reported active, while Soviet artillery positions were sighted opposite Lake Hasan and south of Shachaofeng.

The 75th Infantry Regiment Commander studied the front-line situation and concluded that an assault against the Shachaofeng sector would not suffice, but that the strategic Changkufeng area must likewise be secured. Since the Soviet Army appeared to be building up for an offensive of its own, Col. Sato decided that a "preventive" attack must be launched by his regiment on the night of 30/31 July. Two alternate plans were considered on the 30th: an attack by the 1st Battalion southward against Changkufeng; or by the 3d Battalion, from the north. The first plan was decided upon, to avoid involvement in the Shachaofeng sector.

At 1530 hours on the 30th, all unit commanders were assembled for a briefing at the Chiangchunfeng command post, where it was explained that the regiment would stage a night attack along a line extending north and south of Changkufeng. The intention was to wipe out the enemy in three hours of darkness, between 0200 and dawn.

Company-size elements of the 1st Battalion were to lead off an attack at 0200 from the direction of Hill 52, in the Wofeng (Podgor-naya) village sector. Simultaneously, the 10th Company was to attack along the crest line at the northern foot of Changkufeng, to disrupt the enemy route of retreat. Japanese forces were not to advance north of the wire entanglements after capture of enemy positions on Changkufeng. Elements of the 3d Battalion would constitute the regimental reserve, deployed at the northwestern foot of Chiangchunfeng by 2400 on the 30th.<sup>19</sup>


Although there had been certain doubts, among the local Japanese commanders, that the prohibition of the use of force applied to the Shachao-feng sector, there was no such uncertainty concerning Changkufeng: attack by 19th Divisional forces was categorically forbidden. When the Division Commander arrived at the 75th Infantry Regiment command post, about 1700 hours on the 30th, he was apprised of the regimental plans and studied the situation on-the-spot. Gen. Suetaka then approved the projected night attack, although he strictly ordered that "not one Japanese soldier" was to

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19. A detailed account of the 75th Infantry Regiment's night attack against Changkufeng may be found in the supplement (Part 3) to JRD monograph Japanese Night Combat, pp. 477-97. - Ed.



FIGURE 6



cross the frontier.<sup>20</sup>

The 75th Infantry still had a peacetime T/O & E, which comprised only about half of its wartime strength and equipment, but great importance was attached to the projected night action at Changkufeng. "It was the first battle of the Japanese Army against a Soviet force, and the most efficient battalions were selected for the action; every possible attention was given to details which might assist in insuring victory."<sup>21</sup>

The Soviets were estimated to have some 300 troops on Changkufeng, equipped with two antitank guns, eight heavy machine guns, a dozen automatic rifles, and 20 hand grenade launchers, along a front of little more than 300 meters. Two of the heavy machine guns were mounted in covered emplacements; later, during the course of the attack, it was learned that minefields had been laid between positions. (See Fig. 6). An estimated 20 Soviet artillery pieces were located east of Lake Hasan.


The attack was to be conducted during the hours of complete darkness, between moonset (2230 hours) and sunrise (0508). Visibility proved to be about 10 meters, approaching a maximum of 40

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20. According to Regimental Commander Sato, the Division Commander took the unusual step of giving him written endorsement of the night attack plans. Admittedly, even this reassurance did not wholly free the colonel from worry. Supplementary data based upon Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

21. Japanese Night Combat, p. 482. - Ed.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2



MAINICHI SHIMBUN PHOTO

JAPANESE ARMY UNIT CONSTRUCTING FIELD POSITIONS  
ON WESTERN SLOPE OF CHIANGCHUNFENG (AUG 38).

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 3



MAINICHI SHIMBUN PHOTO

JAPANESE (FOREGROUND) AND SOVIET (BACKGROUND) FORWARD POSITIONS  
15 METERS APART, SUMMIT OF CHANGKUFENG, JUST AFTER CEASE-FIRE  
ANNOUNCEMENT (11 AUG 38). SOVIET SOLDIERS ARE WEARING HELMETS.

meters along the crest line. Reconnaissance indicated the rugged nature of the terrain to be encountered (see Photos No. 2 and 3).

The Japanese night attack jumped off on schedule and, under heavy enemy fire, pushed forward throughout the early hours of 31 July. (See Map No. 8). Losses mounted, and the enemy threw armor against a platoon of the 3d Company which was holding Hill 52. The regimental commander, observing the fighting from Chiangchunfeng Hill, grew alarmed when the flare signifying success had not been set off by 0300 hours. At 0315 he therefore threw in the 6th Company from the direction of Chiangchunfeng. At 0500 that company reported its situation as "extremely critical," and requested artillery support at dawn. Meanwhile, truck- and tank-borne enemy reinforcements were reported moving up from Shachaofeng, while other Soviet troops were sighted scaling the northern slopes of Changkufeng.

A last assault by the 1st and 2d Companies finally penetrated enemy positions on the summit, whereupon desperate hand-to-hand combat ensued. Co-ordinated attacks by the two Japanese companies forced a sudden enemy withdrawal from the summit positions. Soviet reinforcements pulled back to the north in confusion. At 0510 the 1st Battalion captured the peak of Changkufeng, which was immediately taken under fire by enemy artillery. Meanwhile, the Soviets had had three of their tanks knocked out at Hill 52, but had continued

their assaults until dawn, when a Japanese counterattack drove back the decimated Russian infantry company in confusion. Heavy rain began to fall, and the Soviet artillery ceased firing at the 1st Battalion on the summit of Changkufeng. The Japanese now proceeded to secure the line between newly captured Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.

The heavy artillery battery commander, at the 75th Infantry Regiment command post on Chiangchunfeng, later requested permission to fire upon the area south of Shachaofeng. The regimental commander authorized this mission whereupon, during the morning of 31 July, the two Japanese 15-cm. howitzers at Sozan pounded the retreating Soviet infantry. Enemy artillery positions opposite Shachaofeng were also taken under fire and forced to pull out; Col. Sato vividly recalls the battalion of horse-drawn Russian artillery scattering amidst the bombardment.<sup>22</sup>

The Russians were thought to have lost about 300 killed and wounded during the night attack against Changkufeng. About thirty Soviet bodies were recovered by the Japanese. Seven enemy tanks were knocked out, while the following equipment was captured (also see Photo No. 4):

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22. Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

FROM SHACHAOFENG

1ST CO CMDR KIA

ABOUT  
50 MEN

REINFORCEMENT  
BY TRUCKS & TANKS

CHANGKUFENG

(0100) 10:375  
CUTTING OFF OF  
ENEMY RETREAT

TENTS 10:230

(D)

149 M

AXE

10400

8:375

HQ

(0415)

(0305)

X H

BN UNIT CMDR KIA

3D CO CMDR KIA

BN CMDR KIA 0400

### LEGEND


- MACHINE GUN
- ANTITANK GUN
- BATTALION GUN
- REGIMENTAL GUN
- - - ENEMY MACHINE GUN
- - - ENEMY ANTITANK GUN
- II ENEMY TANK

TO  
CHIANGCHUNFENG

# PROGRESS OF NIGHT ATTACK OF 1ST BATTALION, 75TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (31 JULY 1938)

 JAPANESE ARMY  
 SOVIET ARMY

OR KIA




MAP NO. 8

CO CMDR KIA

DR KIA 0400



PHOTOGRAPH NO. 4



MAIN/CHI SHIMBUN PHOTO

SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED DURING CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT,  
ASSEMBLED AT BGU, 76TH INF REGT BARRACKS, KOUPTONG, KOREA.

- 2 antitank guns
- 4 heavy machine guns
- 6 light machine guns
- 6 automatic rifles
- 6 rifle grenade launchers

Japanese casualties were also severe. Thirty men and four officers were killed, the latter including one battalion commander and three out of four company commanders. Three officers and 96 enlisted men were wounded. The Japanese casualties amounted to about one-third of the battalion strength committed and were principally attributable to enemy hand grenade attacks. It had taken more than three hours of furious fighting to capture a 300-meter-deep series of enemy positions. The 1st Battalion had expended its entire offensive power by the time it overran the last enemy defenses on the peak of Changkufeng. Lacking artillery support, the battalion had managed to attain its objective only with great difficulty, and much later than originally planned.<sup>23</sup>

Col. Ryukichi Tanaka, then commanding the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, adds the following information:

When I returned to the west bank of the Tumen River at 0500 hours on 31 July, I saw two Russian tanks which had been disabled by

---

23. Precis based upon Japanese Night Combat, pp. 489-95. Lessons learned by the Japanese from the night attack upon Changkufeng Hill are summarized at ibid., pp. 495-97. - Ed.

15-cm. mortars [howitzers?] on the northern slope of Chiangchunfeng [Changkufeng?], well within Manchukuoan territory.... Three more Russian tanks were disabled that day on the northwestern slope of Shachaofeng,<sup>24</sup> also well within Manchukuoan territory.... All five of these tanks remained in their disabled condition on Manchukuoan territory, even under the Russian claims, throughout the hostilities. In all, ten Russian tanks crossed the border...on 31 July. When I arrived at 0500, Russian artillery was firing on objectives to the west of the river Tumen, and several shells scored hits on my men and guns.<sup>25</sup>

After the conclusion of the night battle, on 31 July, the 19th Division Commander transferred two infantry companies and one half-battery of mountain artillery from the Changkufeng area northward to Wuchiatzu (see Fig. 7). Assigned to Lt. Col. Senda (formerly 76th Infantry Regiment BGU commander), these units assumed border garrison duties in the region previously patrolled by one Japanese infantry platoon and one Manchukuoan police company working with the Hunchun Garrison Unit.


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24. Col. Tanaka appears to be referring to tanks knocked out during the Shachaofeng Incident on 29 July. - Ed.

25. IMTFE, Transcript, 3 Feb 48, pp. 38,850-51. Then-Col. Kotoku Sato (CO, 75th Inf Regt) estimates the Soviet artillery force east of Lake Hasan at a minimum of twenty pieces, including some heavy guns. Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

FIGURE 7

FORCES TRANSFERRED TO WUCHIATZU  
(31 JULY 1938)



 INFANTRY REGIMENTAL GUN

### Soviet Version of Japanese Night Attack

The Soviet commander of the 59th BGU at Changkufeng (Col.

Grebennik) states the following:

Crossing and concentration of Japanese troops on the eastern bank of the Tumen River in the vicinity of Zaozernaya /Changkufeng/ Hill were going on during 30 July. On the night of 30/31 July the Japanese launched a vigorous attack on the Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya (Shachaofeng) hills with artillery support, and hurled into action the whole 19th Infantry Division. By that time, reinforcements of /Soviet/ field troops were only reaching the battlefield and the...hills were defended only by the border guard outfits which had been somewhat reinforced by the reserves I had at my disposal. There were 92 border guards on the two hills, including 60 men on Zaozernaya Hill.

/The border guards were reinforced by/ one infantry company of field troops and a tank platoon. ... The former arrived from the direction of Zarechye, 10 or 12 kms. away, at about 0030 on 31 July. The platoon of three tanks also arrived between 0001 and 0030, and took up initial positions in the vicinity of Hill 68.8, northeast of Bezmyannaya. They came into action at dawn on the same morning, but only one tank participated in the actual fighting because the other two couldn't cross the bog there. The slope of Bezmyannaya is quite accessible to tanks, /whereas/ they couldn't approach the eastern slope of Zaozernaya, which is very steep, more than 45 degrees,... Prior to 31 July there were no /Soviet/ tanks in the Lake Hasan area within a zone of 60-70 kms.

At 0625 on 31 July the Japanese occupied the...hills. Almost all of our border guard

garrison fell on the battlefields. Lt. Tereshkin, the garrison commander and concurrently commanding officer of the outpost, was wounded. Later on, our field troops arrived on the spot, and subsequent operations were conducted under the direction of the Regular Army authorities.

[Only after the arrival of the field troops] were trench works or fortifications constructed by the Soviets.<sup>26</sup> The trenches built by the field troops after 31 July were no more than trenches for lying or sitting; they were dug...to reduce the number of casualties from bullets and shell fragments, and they served to launch counter-attacks when Japanese troops broke into our territory.

It is impossible to undertake any trench work on Zaozernaya Hill, a stone cliff, with an earth crust only 15-20 cms.

...Soviet artillery first arrived on 1 August. There was no Soviet artillery action before that time.<sup>27</sup>

Extracts from the Red Army General Staff's Journal of Battle Actions, drawn up at the time of the fighting, give this brief picture of the night attack by the Japanese:

At 0312 hours on 31 July, the shooting began. Grenades are going off on the southern slopes of Zaozernaya Hill. 0400 hours: the battle goes on. ... A company of the 118th Rifle Regiment with tanks attached was thrown

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26. All Soviet sources reiterate this contention (IMTFE, Transcript, passim); but compare Japanese eyewitnesses' accounts (text, above). - Ed.

27. Extracts from IMTFE, Transcript, 26 Jan 48, pp. 38,296, 38,303-4, 38,312-16, 38,335-36.

into an attack from the direction of Podgornaya. The battalions and a tank company of the 119th Rifle Regiment are concentrated at Hill 68.8. 0420 hours: A [Soviet] group stationed between Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya hills, commanded by Ratnic, has entered into action.<sup>28</sup>

A Soviet noncommissioned officer who participated in the battle at Changkufeng on the night of 30/31 July describes the action thus:

At about midnight of 30 July, approximately one Japanese infantry regiment attacked Zaozernaya, simultaneously with artillery and mortar fire. Under cover of night, the Japanese crossed the frontier to the south of Zaozernaya Hill, penetrated to the rear of our positions, ...and launched an attack. They used approximately a part of their reinforced regiment which was concentrated in Hamoka village and around that place. The second group of Japanese crossed the...border to the north of Zaozernaya and also started an attack. Then other small Japanese forces...attacked the crest of the hill from the front.

...there were about 30 [Soviet] frontier guards (armed with three light machine guns and one heavy machine gun) plus a 30-man platoon of field forces.<sup>29</sup> ... Being in position and fully prepared to fight, [we] engaged in battle. Our guards had the order of the commander of the outpost to hold out to the last and not leave

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28. Ibid., 15 Oct 46, p. 7,814. - Ed.

29. Reinforced to 30 men after 16 July. "At first we had only OP's, three men on Zaozernaya Hill." Ibid., 30 Oct 47, p. 32,175 (Chernopyatko); ibid., 26 Jan 48, p. 38,308 (Grebennik). - Ed.

the hill until the approach of the reserve units of our border guard detachment. After the fighting had started on the eastern slopes of the hill, the platoon of Soviet regular army soldiers arrived.

We engaged in fierce fighting...until dawn (5 A.M.). Almost all of us were either killed or wounded: 15-20 were killed and the rest were wounded. I was slightly wounded and remained on duty until [reinforcements] arrived.

We withdrew from the hill to the banks of Lake Hasan at 6 A.M. At that time I watched the Japanese soldiers come onto the crest of the hill and wave sabers.

Since the land approaches were held by the Japanese, I and Lt. Tereshkin, the wounded commander of the outpost, had to swim across Lake Hasan (50-60 meters wide at the point where I swam). All who could swim [plunged into] the lake. At that time the Japanese were firing at those who were swimming...with artillery and trench mortars.<sup>30</sup>

One of the Soviet platoon leaders involved in the fighting at Changkufeng Hill adds the following information to the Soviet version of the night battle:

According to my calculation, by the 29th of July the Japanese had drawn up about one infantry regiment strengthened with artillery and mortars. There were two [Japanese] artillery [battalions]. ... Approximately two batteries [were concentrated] on a hill to the south of

---

30. Based upon extracts from affidavit and examination of Maj. G. A. Batarshin: ibid., 30 Oct 47, pp. 32,074-75, 32,127; ibid., 31 Oct 47, pp. 32,145-47, 32,150-51. - Ed.



the village of Hamoka. Two batteries were observed to the west of the hill...northwest of Zaozernaya. One battery was on the northern slopes of [the same hill].

On the night of [30] July, I was sent on a reconnaissance party into the depth of our territory for guarding the flank and rear of our disposition. About midnight I heard a noise in the grass, and Japanese speech. This was on Soviet territory 200 meters [behind] the state frontier.

The Japanese also caught sight of us and opened fire. In a few minutes the Japanese batteries from adjacent hills opened a hurricane of artillery and mortar fire against Zaozernaya Hill.

After a short artillery preparation, the Japanese troops simultaneously began attacking Zaozernaya from all sides, going deep into Soviet territory everywhere. ...at about 6 A.M. I was badly wounded. ...On the way to the hospital at Vladivostok (on the afternoon of 31 July), I saw columns of Soviet Army units quickly marching to the place of the clash in the area of Zaozernaya Hill.<sup>31</sup>

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31. Based upon affidavit and examination of Maj. I. D. Chernopyatko, *ibid.*, 15 Oct 46, pp. 7,809-10; *ibid.*, 31 Oct 47, pp. 32,163-64, 32,175, 32,191-92. - Ed.

## CHAPTER 3

### CLIMAX OF CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT

#### Aftermath of Japanese Night Attack

On 31 July, after the Japanese had successfully stormed Changkufeng, the main body of Soviet troops redeployed northward toward Hsiangshantung (Zarechye), leaving elements along the border (Changkufeng-Shachaofeng sector). Other Soviet detachments pulled back to the region north of Hsiangshantung, while troops to the rear (Kraskino?) moved to the right bank of the Fantan River. These redeployments shortened the Soviet frontage.

The following day, the Russians commenced a new series of troop movements, which in effect marked a return to the previous pattern of deployment. By the evening of 1 August, about 3,000 troops, equipped with armor and artillery, had assembled in the vicinity of Hsiangshantung. The same day, the Soviets threw in aircraft for the first time during the Changkufeng Incident. A total of over 130 sorties by Russian fighters and bombers struck at Japanese forward positions, and at Kouptong, Sozan (Chingsan), and Hongui, on 1 August. During the following days, as many as nine separate aerial assault waves were reported, involving formations as large as 55 separate aircraft. Daily sorties by the Soviet Air Force almost invariably exceeded 110, but no night raids were staged. Against a grand total of about 700 Soviet sorties in six days, Japanese ground

fire claimed to have shot down seven aircraft and damaged one (no Japanese aircraft participated in the fighting at Changkufeng, as we have seen). Contemporary Japanese Army data concerning the scale and incidence of Soviet air attacks between 1-10 August are recapitulated in Tables 2-7.

Meanwhile, even after the Shachaofeng Incident on 29 July, the Commanding General, Korea Army, had continued to maintain a policy of localization. When, on 31 July, the 19th Division Commander requested authorization to move up part of the divisional strength, Korea Army disapproved (see Fig. 3). After a re-examination of the situation, however, the Army commander, in an emergency dispatch to the 19th Division on 1 August, ordered a concentration of forces from duty stations in North Korea to assembly areas west of the Tumen, between Agochi, Chonghaktong, and Hayopyong. The redeployment, which involved a brigade headquarters, four infantry battalions, and one mountain artillery battalion (see Fig. 4), took place on 1-2 August.

On his own initiative, the 19th Division Commander ordered the forces being redeployed to the border regions to make preparations for an offensive (2 August). Gen. Suetaka intended to launch his main effort against the Changkufeng-Shachaofeng sector, while two infantry battalions of the 76th Regiment struck toward Hsiangshantung from the direction of Huichungyuan. As soon as IGHQ learned

Table 2

## Soviet Air Attacks, 1 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	1100	2,000	Light Bomber	26	0
2d	1230	2,000	Heavy Bomber	35	0
3d	1430	2,000	?	55	2**
4th	1640	2,000	Light Bomber	35	0
<p>* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Sozan, Hongui, Koup-tong, and Kyonghun Bridge.</p> <p>** One shot down at Sozan; one, at Shuiliufeng.</p> <p>Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Map No. 5.</p>					

Table 3

## Soviet Air Attacks, 2 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	0515-0730	2,000	Fighter & Heavy Bomber	10-30	0
2d	0900-1000	2,000	Fighter & Heavy Bomber	42	0
3d	1100	2,000	Heavy Bomber	21	0
4th	1800	2,000	Heavy Bomber	30	0
<p>* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Hongui, Shikukai, Wuchiatzu; artillery positions west of Nanfengsan and Koup-tong.</p> <p>Source: <u>Ibid.</u>, Map No. 7.</p>					

Table 4

## Soviet Air Attacks, 6 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	1330	1,400	Heavy Bomber & Reconnaissance	30	0
2d	1405	2,300	Fighter	5	0
3d	1410	2,500	Heavy Bomber	7	0
4th	1420	2,600	Heavy Bomber	30	2**
5th	1500	2,600	Light Bomber	48	0
6th	1530	1,200	Fighter	11	1*** (disabled)
7th	1600	1,300	Fighter	9	0
8th	1800	1,300	Reconnaissance	2	0
9th	1920	1,100	Reconnaissance	1	0

\* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Sozan, Hongui, Shikukai, Hayopyong; artillery positions west of Nanfengsan and Kouptong.

\*\* One heavy bomber shot down by ground machine-gun fire at the front; a second, by AA fire west of Kouptong.

\*\*\* One I-15 fighter disabled by AA fire.

Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 45, Map No. 12.

Table 5

## Soviet Air Attacks, 7 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	1000	500	Fighter	20	0
2d	1100	1,000	Fighter	15	0
3d	1205	1,000	Heavy Bomber & Fighter	20	0
4th	1330	3,000-4,000	Heavy Bomber	12	0
5th	1610	3,000	Heavy Bomber	18	0
6th	1620	1,900	Reconnaissance	5	0
7th	1625	4,000	Heavy Bomber	3	0
8th	1640	1,400-4,000	Heavy Bomber	9	0
9th	1737	4,000-5,000	Heavy Bomber	12	0

\* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Sozan, Hongui, Shikukai, Hayopyong, Kyonghun, Muchiatzu, and Kyonghun bridge; artillery positions in Sozan and Ryuken sectors, and west of Nanfengsan and Kouptong.

Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Map No. 15.

Table 6

## Soviet Air Attacks, 8 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	1350	1,300	Reconnaissance	2	0
			Heavy Bomber	15	0
2d	1400	1,000	Fighter	16	0
3d	1440	600	Fighter	16	0
4th	1610	1,700	Fighter	20	1**
5th	1630	4,000	Heavy Bomber	12	0
6th	1650	?	Fighter & Heavy Bomber	20	0
7th	1830	500	Fighter	9	0

\* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Shikukai, Kyonghun, Chonghaktong, Wuchiatzu, Kyonghun Bridge; artillery positions in Ryuken and Sozan sectors, and west of Nanfengsan and Koup-tong.

\*\* One I-15 fighter shot down by AA fire at Sozan.

Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Map No. 18.

Table 7

## Soviet Air Attacks, 10 August 1938

Assault Wave*	Time	Altitude (m.)	Type of Aircraft	No. of Aircraft	Aircraft Shot Down
1st	1600-1800	1,200	Fighter & Reconnaissance	15	0
2d	1900	1,300	Fighter	36	1**
3d	1915	700	Fighter	6	1***
4th	1930	1,300	Fighter	15	0
<p>* Enemy targets: front-line positions, Shikukai, Kyonghun Bridge; artillery positions in Sozan and Ryuken sectors, and west of Nanfengsan and Kouptong.</p> <p>** One I-15 fighter shot down by AA fire at Ryuken.</p> <p>*** One I-15 fighter shot down by AA fire at Kouptong.</p> <p>Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Map No. 22.</p>					



of the 19th Division's projected action, it ordered cancellation thereof (3 August), in accordance with the High Command's policy of localization of the Changkufeng Incident.


#### Soviet Attacks, 1st Phase

After redeploying their ground forces, the Soviet Army launched an assault against the Japanese forces on the morning of 2 August, with the dual objectives of recapturing Hill 52 and the unnamed hill south of Shachaofeng (see Situation Map No. 6, 2 August). The Japanese troops, which consisted essentially of elements of the 75th Infantry Regiment (see Fig. 8), repulsed the Russian attacks. Subsequently, at about 1300 hours on the same day, the Soviets struck at the Shachaofeng sector from the direction of Yangkuanping and reached a point 200 meters from the defense positions, before being checked by Japanese fire. The Russians then fell back to a line about 400 meters away from the defenders. Northward, Soviet artillery bombarded Japanese field fortifications on the heights at Shuiliufeng throughout the day.

Throughout 3 August, from dawn to 1700 hours, Russian artillery fiercely pounded the Changkufeng area, Kouptong, Nanfengsan, and Shuiliufeng. Assaults by Soviet infantry, directed against the same places as on the previous day, were suspended later in the morning of the 3d. The bulk of the enemy forces then withdrew to a line 800-1,000 meters from the Japanese defenses and began to

FIGURE 8

FORCES ENGAGED, 2 AUGUST 1938  
(DATA AS OF 1500 HOURS, 1 AUGUST)



 INFANTRY REGIMENTAL GUN

construct positions.

In the course of the Soviet attacks on 2-3 August, it is estimated that the enemy suffered 300 troop casualties, and that Japanese artillery knocked out 29 tanks. The Russians launched no further large-scale attacks until 6 August.

#### Soviet Attacks, 2d Phase

After the failure of their assaults on 2-3 August, the Soviets limited their actions on the next two days to laying down artillery barrages and conducting frequent aerial reconnaissance flights. Meanwhile, they steadily increased their front-line forces and prepared to mount an offensive. Soviet ground strength was then estimated at 22 infantry battalions, 150 tanks, and some 85 artillery pieces. The Russians enjoyed complete mastery of the air, since the Japanese were not authorized to employ aircraft. Even with reinforcements, the Japanese possessed only eight infantry battalions and 23 guns; nor was armor available to them. Gen. Ken Hashimoto has described the contemporary viewpoint of the Japanese High Command authorities as follows:

After 1 August, the activities of the Soviet Army became more and more positive. Bombardment by superior artillery forces, bombing by airplanes at various points in Korea and, at the same time, infantry attacks supported by tank units--these were repeated almost every day. Our front-line

units repulsed them every time, but never trespassed beyond the boundary, always retiring to the outpost line. Repeating this method, our casualties were augmented daily.

At this time the Korea Army proposed to use our air unit stationed in North Korea<sup>1</sup> to counteract the Soviet offensive, but as the calling out of the air force might lead to the progressive expansion of military activity, the Supreme Command did not accede to the request.

...The Korea Army was very faithful to the principle of the central authorities and maintained the boundary line, bearing well the disadvantageous tactics, and notwithstanding heavy casualties.<sup>2</sup>

The new commander of the 37th Infantry Brigade, Maj. Gen. Nobuki Morimoto, arrived at the front on 3 August.<sup>3</sup> He was immediately ordered by the 19th Division Commander to assume command of all infantry units east of the Tumen river. Subsequent combat operations in the Changkufeng area were therefore directly controlled by Gen. Morimoto, who divided his forces into a Left and a Right Sector, and a Brigade Reserve (see Fig. 9).


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1. The nearest air strength of the Korea Army at the time of the Changkufeng Incident was located at Hoeryong, the duty station of the 9th Air Regiment. This regiment comprised one squadron of fighters, and another of light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.  
- Ed.

2. Based upon affidavit of 5 Jan 47; ILTFE, Transcript, 20 May 47, pp. 22, 589-90. - Ed.

3. The commanding generals of the 37th (Hamhung) and 38th (Nanam) Infantry Brigades had been routinely reassigned on 15 July.

FIGURE 9



On 4-5 August, Japanese front-line units dug in and endeavored to regroup, while improving their combat readiness in order to cope with the possible resumption of enemy assaults.

On 5 August, the 19th Division Commander transferred the 76th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st Battalion and Regimental Gun Company) from Huichungyuan westward to Hayopyong. The unit was placed under the operational control of the 37th Infantry Brigade on the following day.

The 19th Division also transferred the bulk of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (headquarters and two batteries), then deployed west of Kyonghun, to the sector west of the Tumen River, across from Changkufeng (5 August). In view of the short range of the 15-cm. howitzers, however, the Division Commander asked Korea Army for long-range guns. IGHQ approved the request and, on 6 August, ordered Kwantung Army to transfer the following artillery units to Korea Army:

Indep Hv Arty Btry (two Type 89 15-cm. cannon)

1st Indep Mixed Brig Arty Unit (two btries  
Type 90 7.5-cm. field guns: eight pieces)

2d Armd Train Unit (two 10-cm. and two 7-cm.  
AA guns)

The greater part of these units arrived behind the assembly area west of the Tumen River, across from the Changkufeng sector, on 8

August.


Meanwhile, on 6 August, the Soviets resumed full-scale ground assaults, supported by more than 150 aircraft (see Table 1 and Situation Map No. 7). Japanese troops repulsed the heavy attacks throughout the day, and knocked out 40-50 enemy tanks, but the Russians showed no signs of letting up. Their assaults continued into the night, especially against Changkufeng Hill where, for a while, Japanese positions appeared to be on the verge of collapse. The defenders managed to hold on, however, with the aid of steadily received reinforcements.

On 7 August the reinforced enemy continued to launch co-ordinated attacks, which were particularly severe in the sector of Hill 52. (See Table 1). Again the Japanese defenses appeared to be crumbling, but the units clung to the heights.

In view of the worsening battle situation, the Commanding General, Korea Army, on 7 August ordered the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters (Nanam) and the 74th Infantry Regiment (Hamhung) to move to the front. On 8 August the brigade headquarters arrived at Kyonghun, and the regiment reached the Kouptong area.

During 8 and 9 August, Soviet armor pulled back from the front, and the air attacks simultaneously decreased. (See Situation Map No. 9, 8 August). Enemy ground assaults continued, however, and front-line casualties steadily mounted. Lacking air support, and

# MAP NO. 9





dwindling in troop strength, the Japanese units appeared to be undergoing demoralization.

In contrast with the alleged pessimism of Korea Army Headquarters and of the central authorities, local unit commanders who had been in the area from the start felt that the fierce fighting on 7 August had hurt the Soviet Army very badly. After inspecting the front-line situation from the heights at Fangchuan-ting, on the morning of 8 August, the 75th Infantry Regimental Commander concluded that the Russians were both discouraged and beaten. In fact, the Japanese intercepted a message transmitted to Marshal Blucher<sup>4</sup> by the local Soviet commander in the Changkufeng area, to the effect that Russian losses could be expected to double if the fighting continued.<sup>5</sup>

#### Denouement

By 10 August, Soviet ground strength had been built up to 27 infantry battalions (from 10 on the 3d) and some 100 artillery pieces (from 40 on the 3d). Against these forces, the Japanese 19th Division could muster only 12 infantry battalions and 33 guns (mostly 75-mm. mountain artillery). Further reinforcements were almost impossible in the near future, but the division commander

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4. See footnote 10, below. - Ed.

5. Date of intercept unknown; supplementary data based upon Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

was determined to hold on as long as possible with his existing strength. In an order-of-the-day on 10 August the commander exhorted all officers and men of the 19th Division to defend their positions to the last man, in the tradition of Masashige Kusunoki.<sup>6</sup> The situation grew so critical at the front, however, that on 10 August the chief of staff of the 19th Division took the unusual step of advising the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army that "appropriate diplomatic measures are immediately imperative."

At 1120 hours on 11 August, Korea Army learned from IGHQ that an armistice had been worked out between Japan and the U.S.S.R., to become effective at 1200 hours that day. (See Appendix D). This information was disseminated to all front-line Japanese troops by 1155 hours.<sup>7</sup> (See Situation Map No. 10, 11 August, and Photo . . . 3). The Soviet colonel commanding the 59th BGU at Changkufeng later complained that "the fighting actually ceased at 1205 hours; [although] according to the agreement the Japanese were supposed to cease fighting at 1200 sharp, they didn't do so."<sup>8</sup> Contemporary


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6. The famous medieval Japanese warrior Masashige Kusunoki gallantly held Chihaya Castle for the Emperor with several hundred men against an alleged 1,000,000 (ca. 1333 A. D.). - Ed.

7. Supplementary data from Faikosha Kiji, Sept. 1938, #768, p. 20. - Ed.

8. Cross-examination of Maj. Gen. K. Y. Grebennik, ILTFM Transcript, 26 Jan 48, p. 38,337. - Ed.

# MAP NO. 10



Soviet official communiques make no mention of such "dissatisfaction."<sup>9</sup>

Shortly after noon on the 11th, the 19th Division Commander appointed Col. Isamu Cho (74th Infantry Regiment Commander) and two other officers to represent the Japanese side at front-line truce talks with the Russians. To the first meeting at 2000 hours on the 11th, the Soviets sent Gen. Stern, Chief of Staff of the Far East area army,<sup>10</sup> and two other officers. The conferees met east of Changkufeng, in a Soviet breastwork. Two more meetings were held on 12 August and a last on the 13th.<sup>11</sup> The net result

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9. The official Soviet Tass communique stated that hostilities ceased on 11 August at 1330 hours (local time), "as agreed" between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Ibid., 22 May 47, p. 22,876. See Appendix D. - Ed.

10. The Soviet commander-in-chief of the Special Far East Army (reorganized into the 1st and 2d Red Banner Armies after the Changkufeng Incident) was then Marshal Blucher. In December 1938, Blucher was reported to have been executed by the Soviet authorities. One Soviet defector later stated that the Marshal had "believed that war with Japan was necessary and provoked the 'two-hills incident' which ultimately cost him his life." The same source alleges that Blucher was imprisoned in the Lubianka Prison in Moscow, where he hanged himself. Ivan Krylov, Soviet Staff Officer (London, 1951), p. 9; quoted in F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (London, 1954), p. 160, n. 3. Also see Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XIII, p. 56. - Ed.

11. The Russians and the Japanese exchanged corpses on 13 August, the same day that the fourth and final conference was held. Kaikosha Kiji, loc. cit. The talks broke down at the working level because of disagreement over boundary demarcation, which the Japanese said indicated Soviet "insincerity." Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 1. Also see Appendix D. - Ed.

JAPANESE CASUALTIES, CHANGKUFENG, JULY-AUGUST 1938

Table 8

Unit	T/O strength (Peacetime Basis)	Force Engaged	KIA	WIA	Total Casualties	Casualties as % of Force Engaged
19th Div Hq	159	42	0	1	1	2.4
73d Inf Regt	1,213	1,068	93	90	183	17.1
74th Inf Regt	1,471	1,461	3	33	36	2.5
75th Inf Regt	1,507	1,379	241	467	708	51.3
76th Inf Regt	1,500	1,094	138	197	335	30.6
25th Mt Arty Regt	609	521	18	32	50	9.6
1st Indep Mixed Brig Arty Unit	449			Unknown		
Indep Hv Arty Btry	145			Unknown		

\* Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 4.

Table 8  
(contd.)

Unit	T/O Strength (Peacetime Basis)	Force Engaged	KIA	WIA	Total Casualties	Casualties as % of Force Engaged
15th Hq FA Regt	213	257	1	4	5	1.9
2d Co, 27th Cav Regt	84	59	2	4	6	10.2
AAA units**	507	305	6	40	46	15.0
19th Engr Regt	233	238	13	21	34	15.1
AGU, 76th Inf Regt	292	133	6	12	18	13.5
Prov Med Unit	134	134	4	10	14	10.4
Sig Unit	108	123	1	2	3	2.4
TOTAL	8,624	6,814	526	913	1,439	21.1

\*\* AA units include 5th AA Regt (T/O 209), 20th Depot Div AA Unit (96), and 2d Armd Train Unit (202).

was Japanese acceptance of the border line claimed by the Soviet authorities. Russian troops thereafter retained the high ground east of the Tumen River, in the Changkufeng-Shachaofeng sector.

In accordance with orders received from IGHQ on 11 August, the Korea Army directed the 19th Division to pull back all of its forces from the east to the west bank of the river Tumen (1240 hours, 12 August). The left bank of the Tumen was entirely cleared of Japanese troops by midnight of 13 August, and the bulk of the 19th Division reassembled in the area between Chonghaktong, Agochi, and Hayopyong.

#### Casualties

In the fighting at Changkufeng, during July and August 1938, Japanese forces inflicted considerable troop losses upon the enemy, although the numbers cannot be confirmed. Publicly released Japanese data estimated Russian casualties at 4,500; the commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment believed the Soviets lost a total of about 7,000. At the time, the Russians officially admitted losing only 236 killed and 611 wounded.<sup>12</sup>

Japanese personnel casualties were heavy, as may be seen from

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12. Kaikosha Kiji, Sept 38, p. 19; Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56; and D. J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, 1948), p. 3. The Japanese admitted losing only 158 killed and 740 wounded, at the time. - Ed.

Table 8. As a proportion of the troops actually committed to combat, the Japanese lost over 20% killed or wounded (i. e., almost 1,500 officers and men). Some front-line units lost more than half of their operational strength. Losses of officers and noncommissioned officers were especially severe, as in the case of the 75th Infantry Regiment (see Tables 9 and 10).

A statistical breakdown of the causation of Japanese casualties at Changkufeng indicates that shellfire exacted the greatest toll (37%), very closely followed by small arms fire (36%). Hand grenades accounted for the third greatest number of Japanese casualties (23%). Total casualty data are recapitulated in Table 11.

#### Artillery Expenditure

Col. Ryukichi Tanaka, commander of all Japanese artillery forces engaged at Changkufeng, states that the number of shells possessed by his units was relatively small, and that if more than 1,000 rounds had been fired per day, the ammunition stocks would soon have been depleted. After the conclusion of hostilities, the Japanese investigated their total artillery expenditure and estimated it at 12,000 rounds. According to Col. Tanaka, this figure was less than the Soviet Army fired at the Japanese in one day.<sup>13</sup>

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13. INTEF, Transcript, 22 May 47, pp. 22,746-47. - Ed.



Table 9

## BATTLE CASUALTY DATA, 75th INF REGT, CHANGKUFENG\*

Rank	No. Engaged	KIA	WIA	Total Casualties	% of No. Engaged	Remarks
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## INFANTRY OFFICERS &amp; M/SGTS

Col.	1	0	0	0	0	Rgtl CO: Col. Kotoku Sato
Lt. Col.	1	0	0	0	0	Exec Offer
Maj.	4	2	0	2	50.0	Bn Commdrs: 3; Rgtl Aide: 1
Capt.	6	3	2	5	83.3	Co Commdrs
1st Lt.	9	5	2	7	77.7	Co Commdrs: 7; Plat Ldr: 1; Sig Offer: 1
2d Lt.	7	0	2	2	28.6	Plat Ldrs: 3; Bn Aides: 3; Rgtl Color Bearer: 1
W/O	15	2	6	8	53.3	Plat Ldrs: 14; Rgtl Hq: 1
M/Sgt	18	3	9	12	66.7	Plat Ldrs

\* Platoon Leader rank and above. Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 2.

Table 9  
(contd.)

Rank	No. Engaged	KIA	WIA	Total Casual- ties	% of No. En- gaged
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MEDICAL OFFICERS

Capt.	2	0	2	2	100.0
2d Lt.	1	0	0	0	0

INTENDANCE OFFICERS

1st Lt. (Paymaster)	1	0	0	0	0
W/O (Paymaster)	1	0	0	0	0

TOTAL	66	15	23	38	
PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES		22.7	34.9	57.6	

Table 10

**EFFECTS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES,  
75th INF REGT, CHANGKUFENG\***

	Bn Commdrs	% Casual- ties	Co Commdrs	% Casual- ties	Plat Ldrs	% Casual- ties
Total No. Engaged	3	-	13	-	36	-
KIA	2	66.7	8	61.5	5	13.9
WIA	0	0	3	23.1	17	47.2
Total Casualties	2	66.7	11	84.6	22	61.1

\* Platoon Leader rank and above. Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 2.

Table 11

## JAPANESE CASUALTIES AT CHANGKUFENG, BY CAUSE\*

Causative Weapon	KIA	WIA	Total Casualties	
			No.	% of Total
Shellfire	229	303	532	37.0
Small Arms	192	323	515	35.8
Hand Grenades	88	239	327	22.7
Aerial Bombs	8	30	38	2.6
Bayonets	0	4	4	0.3
Others	0	23	23	1.6

\* Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 4.

Table 12

JAPANESE ARTILLERY EXPENDITURE, CHANGKUFENG\*

Artillery Rounds	Numbers Expended			
	25th Mt Arty Regt	15th Hv FA Regt	2d Armd Train Unit	TOTAL
Shrapnel, 75-mm. Gun	6,453	-	-	6,453
Shell, 75-mm. Gun	1,591	-	-	1,591
Shell, AP, 75-mm. Gun	4	-	-	4
Shell, 105-mm. Gun (Ry)	-	-	51	51
Shrapnel, 150-mm. How	-	1,095	-	1,095
TOTAL	8,048	1,095	51	9,194

\* Source: Official General Staff History of Changkufeng Incident, 8 Oct 43, Chart 5; and letter of Lt. Col. Suteso Morita (CO, 2d Armd Train Unit), 11 Jul 56 (see Appendix E).

Official Japanese data on the expenditure of artillery at Changkufeng are presented in Table 12. Supplementary information on the brief combat participation of the 2d Armored Train Unit (11 August) may be found in Appendix E.

The commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment later likened the rate of Soviet artillery fire to that of machine guns; and the Japanese, to that of "rain drops," by comparison. The ratio in favor of total Russian artillery expenditure may have reached 100:1, a disparity attributable to differing tactical concepts, and the Japanese lack of experience with massed artillery fire, which European armies mastered in World War I.<sup>14</sup>

### Conclusion

Japanese front-line forces, who had unilaterally established a border line where the demarcation was unclear, considered it their duty to defend Manchukuoan territory and not to bow to enemy aggression. The Changkufeng Incident itself resulted from the provocative firing of a few Soviet soldiers. When fighting broke out, the Japanese dealt some heavy blows against the Russians; this, in turn, aggravated the enemy's hostility.

With the build-up of Soviet forces, the Japanese thereafter

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14. Recommendations for a drastic increase in the scale of Japanese artillery usage were submitted after the conclusion of the Changkufeng Incident, but were reportedly not adopted. Sato Interview, 26 Jun 56. - Ed.

resorted only to defensive operations, to the last. Japanese strength committed was small, since the authorities had determined to prevent enlargement of the incident. Such an approach rendered it impossible to take positive action, and exposed the weaknesses in Japan's national strength. Nationalist China consequently gained the impression that Japan need not be feared.

Appendix A

TREATY OF PEKING (PEIPING), 14 Nov 1860\*

The basic pact pertaining to the then-Chinese and Russian borders in the Far East was the Additional Treaty of Peking, signed in 1860 by representatives of the two now defunct empires. The agreements subsequently reached in 1861 and 1886 (by the terms of the Hunchun Protocol) in no way invalidated or superseded the treaty of 1860, but were essentially demarcation agreements dealing with particular portions of the borders.

Article 1. ...Henceforward the eastern border between the two Empires shall start from the confluence of the rivers Shilka and Argun, descend the course of the Amur River to the confluence of that river with the Ussuri River. The territory on the northern side belongs to Russia, and the whole territory on the southern side as far as the estuary of the river Ussuri belongs to China. Further, from the confluence of the Ussuri River to Lake Hsingkai [Hanka], the border line shall follow the rivers Ussuri and Sungacha. The territory on the eastern side of both rivers belongs to Russia, and that on the western side to China. From the source of the river Sungacha, the border line between the two Empires shall cross Lake Hsingkai, and reach directly the estuary of the Pailin River; from the latter estuary, it shall run along the mountains and reach the

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\* Based upon ILTM, Transcript, 21 May 47, pp. 22,692-98. Also see Chapter 1, Part 1 of the present study. - Ed.



estuary of the river Huputu; and farther from the estuary of the Huputu, it shall reach the estuary of the river Tumen, running along the mountains situated between the river Hunchun and the sea. The east of the border line all belongs to Russia, and the west of it all belongs to China. The point where the border line of both Empires meets the river Tumen shall be no farther than twenty Chinese li from its estuary.

Further, in execution of Article 9 of the Treaty of Tientsin [1858], a map shall be drawn, on which a red line shall demarcate the border. On that line shall be inscribed Russian alphabetical letters...in order to facilitate close inspection.

This map shall be signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Empires and their seals shall be affixed thereto in testimony.

In case there should be tracts of land colonized by Chinese subjects, /or/ fishery and hunting grounds occupied by Chinese subjects, in the waste territory referred to above, Russia shall not occupy them simultaneously, and shall permit the Chinese subjects to engage, as in the past, in fishing and hunting. After the border marks shall have been established, they shall not be altered permanently, nor shall territory in their neighborhood or in any other place be occupied.

## Appendix B

### HUNCHUN BORDER PACT (1886)

The Russo-Chinese agreement of 3 June 1886 is variously known as the Hunchun Border Pact or Treaty, and as the Yenchu Protocol.\* Yenchu is the modern Kraskino (Novokievsk). The Russian and the Chinese representatives signed and certified a basic protocol, six sectional maps, detailed charts of boundary marker localities, and other attached documents. The eight existing wooden boundary posts were now replaced by 11 stone markers, and in addition 26 frontier markers were established. Extracts from the agreements of 1886, as given in the present Appendix, are based upon unofficial translations contained in Japanese documentation concerning treaty records.\*\* Maps are omitted from the cited records.

#### PROTOCOL

Signed at Yenchu, 3 June 1886

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China,  
and His Imperial Majesty the Czar of Russia recognize that many of the wooden boundary markers placed on the eastern border between the two

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\* For IMTFE references and annotation, see Chapter 1, Footnote 10, in Part 1 of the present study. - Ed.

\*\* It is known that a Collection of Border Treaties between Manchukuo and the U.S.S.R. was compiled in July 1943 by the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The records contained parallel Chinese and Japanese texts of the original documents, including the Hunchun Border Protocol, at p. 78 therein. - Ed.

countries have rotted away and disintegrated, and that the demarcation lines drawn in red on the maps exchanged in 1861 are not precise, thus being liable to cause disputes through a misunderstanding by officials and inhabitants of the two countries. Therefore, the Chinese Government has appointed Wu Tacheng, Consultant to the Chief Director for Northern Affairs and Deputy Chief of the Board of Censors; and Iko-tanga, Assistant Director for Kirin Provincial Defense Affairs and Hunchun Regional Deputy Commander;

while the Russian Government has duly appointed Baranov, Governor of the Maritime Province and Area Commander; Shurichin, Director of the Geographic Survey Bureau; Conrad, Executive Director for Military Affairs and Garrison Commander; and Machunin, Commissioner of the South Ussuri Province;

to the post of plenipotentiary representatives respectively, who, in obedience to the respective Imperial wishes, have conferred and have made the following agreements on matters regarding the border between the two countries.

1. The boundary marker T along the Tumen River bank shall be re-established because it has disintegrated with the lapse of time. Agreement has been reached, in accordance with the Note on Border Lines (1861), to re-establish the boundary marker T at a place along the river bank where the foot of the mountain ends and is at a point 15 fifteen Russian miles or thirty Chinese li from the sandbar in the river Tumen, or over 13.5 Russian miles or 27 Chinese li when measured in a straight line to the sea.\*

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\* Amplified text provided from IMTFF, Transcript, 21 May 47, p. 22,699. - Ed.

2. Agreement has been reached to establish the additional boundary marker R on the line along the border between Mongolgorod in Russian territory and Hunchun, because the interval between boundary markers T and P is too long; and to establish an additional boundary marker S on the line along the border between Achimi in Russian territory and Hunchun. Furthermore, in reference to the original map drawn in 1861, it has been agreed to establish boundary marker M at Tashukangtzu southwest of the boundary marker R, on the road on the border between Luli and Ninghuta. The said three stone boundary markers shall be newly established, and the former seven wooden boundary markers E, I, K, L, N, O, and P shall be changed to stone markers.

3. Agreement has been reached on the plan that kalun (border observation posts) in Russian territory, and residents who have lived in the Heitingtzu area in Chinese territory, shall be evacuated to Russian territory by the end of June 1886; and that at the time of evacuation, the Border Demarcation Commission of the two countries shall dispatch respective representatives to the said area to conduct the definite transfer.

4. Negotiations shall be conducted to the effect that the incoming and outgoing of Chinese vessels shall not be checked in the mouth of the Tumen River and its course bordering Korea and extending 30 Chinese li from the boundary marker T. Plenipotentiary Representative Baranov has communicated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regard to this matter and, after receiving instructions, supplementary articles shall be added to this treaty.

5. There is a question whether the original boundary marker shall be removed on account of the fact that the boundary marker W at the

mouth of the Huputu River, and the boundary marker N at Suifenhao Peishan, are not in conformity with the former map; therefore, plenipotentiary representatives of the two countries shall conclude an agreement after conducting on-the-spot investigation.

6. As for the section of the Hunchun border extending from Changlingtzu along the watershed to the mouth of the Tumen River, two copies of sectional maps shall be drawn, and each of them shall be kept by the two countries after the commission consisting of the representatives of the two countries have signed and affixed their seals.

The section from Changlingtzu northward to the mouth of the Pailing River shall be divided into several subsections and two copies of a sectional map shall be drawn for each subsection. After the Russian representative has made the said map under the supervision of Shurichin, the Border Demarcation Commission shall sign and affix a seal to the Note on Border Lines, for each sectional map, and shall exchange them.

7. At present, 11 stone boundary markers have been established; however, because the interval between boundary markers is extremely long, the border line between the markers meanders and is studded with groves, and the border is not clear in some places. Measures must be taken to make it clear by establishing other markers or by digging ditches to supplement the shortage of boundary markers. Each established marker shall have a number (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) inscribed on it and shall be entered in detail on each sectional map to be drawn up in greater detail than were the former maps.

8. Two copies of a detailed map shall be drawn up for each marker to be established, e.g., the said 11 stone boundary markers. After all maps are completed, the Hunchun Regional Deputy Commander and the Russian Com-

missioner shall meet and sign them. One copy shall be sent to the Foreign Affairs Office in Peking, and another to the Russian capital for retention by both parties.

Agreement has been reached on the foregoing eight items, and the officials and inhabitants of the two countries shall promote friendly relations between each other, and must not be suspicious of nor oblivious to this, forever. The present agreement shall be written in two copies, in the Russian, Manchu and Chinese languages; the Manchu text shall be the official one. The present agreement, after having been signed and sealed, shall be attached to the Note on Border Lines (1861) and shall be observed and unchanged forever.

FOR CHINA:

WU, Imperial Envoy, Consultant to Chief Director for Northern Affairs, Second Rank Officer, and Deputy Chief of the Board of Censors.

I, Imperial Envoy, Assistant Director for Kirin Provincial Defense Affairs, and Hunchun Regional Deputy Commander.

FOR RUSSIA:

BARANOV, Imperial Envoy, Governor of the Maritime Province, and Area Commander.

SHURICHIN, Director of Geographic Survey Bureau.

CONRAD, Executive Director for Military Affairs, and Garrison Commander.

MACHUNIN, Commissioner for the South Ussuri Province.

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## NOTE ON BORDER LINES

The border line mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the Protocol shall be the line extending from the Tumen River to the astronomical observatory on Changling, according to the map drafted from a survey made by the Russian representatives in 1884. This mountain range lies between Hunchun kalun (border observation post) in Russian territory and Erhtaoho kalun in Chinese territory. The distance from the location of the new boundary marker T on the road between Hunchun and Yenchu to the astronomical observatory shall be 65.6 Russian miles or about 131 Chinese li, and the red line on the map shall form the border along the watershed. Thus, the waters flowing westward into Tumen River shall be under the jurisdiction of China, while the waters flowing east of the watershed into the sea shall be Russian. The distance southward from the boundary marker T along the Tumen River to Haikou shall be 15 Russian miles or about 30 Chinese li, whereas the direct distance measured on land to the tip of Shatan shall be 13 Russian miles and 455 sazhen /1 sazhen is equivalent to 2.134 meters/ or about 27 Chinese li. The dimensions of the stone boundary marker T shall be one sazhen or about seven Chinese feet high; 10 Russian inches or about 15 Chinese inches wide; and four Russian inches or about six Chinese inches thick. On one side, the Russian letter T, and on the other the Chinese characters T-T'zu-Pai shall be inscribed; the month and year shall be inscribed on the sides.

The portion of the boundary marker to be buried shall be one Russian foot, or about two feet three inches in Chinese measurement. The foundation shall be made of hard rock, and a deep trench shall be dug around the foundation, filled with brick and cemented with mortar.

Marker No. 1 shall be established north of Shakangpeitzu, by proceeding northwest from

boundary marker T across the mountain and then west of Lake Khasan, covering a distance of eight li and 100 sazhen.

Marker No. 2 shall be established at Tkang-tsui by proceeding north one li and 65 sazhen from Marker No. 1, and then northwest four li and 135 sazhen along the sandy ridge.

Marker No. 3 shall be established on the road connecting Hanchi and Yinganho by proceeding southeast from Marker No. 2, going around the marshland, turning and proceeding northward to Palanofushan, then turning east from the north of this mountain to Paerhpashishan, and continuing northeast. The distance covers 13 li and 465 sazhen.

Marker No. 4 shall be established by proceeding northwest from Marker 3 for two li and 400 sazhen along the flat hill.

Marker No. 5 shall be established on the level slope located at the foot of Machiuningshan, by proceeding northwest and crossing several hills, covering two li and 150 sazhen from Marker No. 4.

Marker No. 6 shall be established on the road leading to Yenchuho at Heitingtzu, by proceeding northwest from Marker 5, six li and 285 sazhen along the flat hill and crossing several ditches.

Marker No. 7 shall be established on top of the mountain, by proceeding northwest from Marker No. 6 to Hushan (Hiaoheitingtzushan), then turning southwest to Lushan (Taheitingtzushan), then turning northwest and crossing a large mountain to Kolatoshan, up a steep and narrow path, around the upstream reaches of the Chulunho, turning east and then north to the mountain top. Although this mountain is not high, the road is very rugged. The distance from Marker No 6 to Marker No 7 is 20 li and 475 sazhen.



Marker No 8 shall be established at the astronomical observatory erected in 1884, by proceeding northeast from Marker No 7 three li and 280 sazhen, then north one li and 60 sazhen, and east 330 sazhen.

The foregoing mile figures are Russian miles; one Russian mile is equivalent to approximately two Chinese li. One sazhen is equivalent to seven-odd Chinese feet.

The astronomical observatory is a brick structure, and the foundation is hardened with rocks.

Other stone markers shall be inscribed with their respective numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) and shall be placed on mounds hardened with buried rocks.

The Demarcation Plenipotentiary Representatives of the two countries shall sign this agreement written in duplicate in Chinese, Manchu and Russian, and each country shall retain custody of one copy with attached maps.

Appendix C

EXTRACTS FROM IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMY ORDERS

(July-August 1938)

------(1)-----

16 July 1938

The Commanding General, Korea Army, may concentrate units under his command near the borders in Korea, as necessary, against illegal frontier crossing by Soviet forces in the vicinity of Changkufeng.

Resort to force will be only upon order, however.

------(2)-----

30 July 1938

The Commanding General, Korea Army, may resort to force against the illegal border crossing of the Soviet Army in the vicinity of Changkufeng.

------(3)-----

1 August 1938

The Commanding General, Korea Army, will temporarily occupy the vicinities of Changkufeng and Shachacofeng, in the general vicinity of the present forward line, and will also maintain strict security along other fronts on the Manchukuo-U.S.S.R. borders.

------(4)-----

2 August 1938

1. The Commanding General, Korea Army, will execute combat emergency preparations for the Najin Fortress, anti-aircraft defense

of the 19th Division defense area, and emergency antiaircraft defense of strategic points, in accordance with the Korea Army Wartime Defense Plan of 1938.

2. One battery of the Maizuru Heavy Artillery Regiment will be placed under the command of the Korea Army for combat emergency preparations at the Najin Fortress.

3. Hereafter, antiaircraft units (excluding air force units) at strategic points, and defense units which have already been ordered to undertake combat emergency preparations, will be transferred as necessary for the air defense of the 19th Division's defense zone.

------(5)-----

2 August 1938

1. The Najin Fortress will make emergency preparations for combat.

2. In accordance with the annual plan, the 16th Depot Division Commander will dispatch one battery of the Maizuru Heavy Artillery Regiment immediately to Najin, and will place it under the Commanding General, Korea Army, upon the regiment's arrival.

------(6)-----

10 August 1938

The following units will be placed under the Commanding General, Korea Army:

From order of battle of North China Area Army [Hq: Peiping]:

6th Indep MG Bn

$\frac{1}{2}$  of 1st Hv FA Brig Trans Unit

From order of battle of Mongolia Garrison Army [Hq: Kalgan]

6th Field AAA Unit (1st Div)

2d Field AAA Unit (20th Div)

----- (7) -----

10 August 1938

The following units will be assigned to the Commanding General,  
Korea Army:

7th and 8th Field AAA Units, Kwantung Army

----- (8) -----

11 August 1938

At an opportune time, the Commanding General, Korea Army, will concentrate strength, now occupying the vicinities of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, back to the right bank of the Tumen River; after which the units will be returned to their duty stations at the Army Commander's discretion.

Strict guard will be maintained along the Korea Army front on the Manchukuo-Soviet borders.

----- (9) -----

11 August 1938

Combat action against Soviet forces in the Changkufeng-Shachaofeng areas will hereafter be suspended.

----- (10) -----

11 August 1938

The following unit will be placed under the Commanding General,  
Korea Army:

1st Indep Mixed Brig Engr Unit (- one co)

----- (11) -----

12 August 1938

Even after completion of its emergency mobilization,\* the 19th Division will remain under the Commanding General, Korea Army. The 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment will remain under the 19th Division Commander.

----- (12) -----

17 August 1938

1. Among the following units, those under the Commanding General, Korea Army, will be removed from his command and will be returned to the original command of the North China Area Army. Other units which have not yet been assigned to the Commanding General, Korea Army, will not be placed under his command:

6th Indep MG Bn  
2d Hv FA Regt  
½ of 1st Hv FA Brig Trans Unit  
1st Field AAA Unit (3d Div)  
6th Field AAA Unit (1st Div)  
1st Field AAA Unit (20th Div)

---

\* IGHQ ordered the 19th Division mobilized on a combat emergency basis as of 10 August; the process should ordinarily consume about one week. - Ed.

2. The Commanding General, Korea Army, will transfer the heretofore cited units now under his command to North China, where they will be reassigned to the Commanding General, North China Area Army. The latter himself will reassume control over those of his units which have not yet joined the Korea Army.

3. Of the units cited in Para. 1 above, those which have already been assigned to the Korea Army Commander will be removed from his command and returned to their original command, effective upon passing through Tumen or Sambongdon [on the Tumen River], or upon crossing the Yalu.

------(13)-----

24 August 1938

The following units will be removed from the command of the Korea Army and will be returned to the original command of the Kwangtung Army:

1st Indep Mixed Brig Arty Unit (- one btry)  
Indep Hv Arty Btry  
2d Armd Train Unit  
1st Indep Mixed Brig Engr Unit (- one co)

-----

## Appendix D

### DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING END OF CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT

On 10 August 1938, at 2200 hours, the Information Section of the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement concerning the agreement reached by Shigemitsu and Litvinov in Moscow that day, whereby hostilities were to cease at Changkufeng:\*

A. Both sides shall stop military operations at noon (Maritime Province time) on the 11th.

B. Both Japanese and Soviet troops should maintain the line as of 0001 (Maritime Province time) on the 11th.

It has been decided that the practical measures to fulfill the agreement shall be conferred upon between the representatives of both armies.

C. According to the announcement of the War Ministry at 1800 hours on the 11th, tranquility reigns in the districts near Changkufeng since the morning of the 11th.

A communique issued by Tass, the official Soviet news agency, on the evening of 11 August 1938, stated:

...as agreed between the Soviet Union and Japan on 10 August, hostilities in the zone of Lake Hasan ceased on 11 August at 1330 hours local time. The first meeting of military representa-

---

\* Based upon LTTE, Transcript, 22 May 47, p. 22,875. - Ed.

tives of both sides for the purpose of fixation of the position of troops took place south of Zaozernaya /Changkufeng/ on the evening of 11 August. The next meeting is scheduled for noon on 12 August.\*

A week later, Tass published a report that the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow had informed the Soviet Foreign Office that

...the agreement for a truce in the region of Lake Hasan has been put into effect and that the forces on both sides at the present time are at some distance from each other. The communique adds that, in view of the foregoing, the Japanese Embassy had proposed that, should further questions arise which require meetings between the representatives of the Japanese and Soviet military commands, such meetings should be arranged through diplomatic conversations between Moscow and Tokyo.

...the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy was informed that this proposal was acceptable.\*\*

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\* Ibid., p. 22,876. - Ed.

\*\* Ibid., p. 22,878. - Ed.



## Appendix E

### ACTIONS OF 2d ARMORED TRAIN UNIT AT CHANGKUFENG\*

The brief participation of the 2d Armored Train Unit at Changkufeng represents the first combat action by this type of artillery in Japanese Army history. Special 10-cm. railway guns were designed by the Army Ordnance Bureau in 1931, and the manufactured weapons were shipped to Manchuria, where the 3d Railway Regiment stored them until 1938 at Kobo, a suburb of Harbin.

The commander of the 2d Armored Train Unit (Lt. Col. Sutezo Morita) was at Dairen when Kwantung Army Headquarters received orders from Imperial General Headquarters to send the unit to support the Korea Army [6 Aug 38]. Preparations were to be completed within one week, and the unit was to reach Hsinasan by 10 August. In great secrecy, the train reached Hsinasan on schedule, and was immediately ordered to go into action, under command of the 19th Division. (For unit make-up, see accompanying Figure).

Col. Morita prepared to set up his unit in the Shikukai sector, and immediately tried to contact Col. Tanaka, the artillery commander. Despite several attempts, the desired information could not be obtained, and Col. Morita had to acquire counterbattery fir-

---

\* Data provided by then-Lt. Col. Sutezo Morita, commanding the 2d Armd Train Unit; letter to editor, under date of 11 Jul 56, from Fujisawa City, Kanagawa Prefecture. - Ed.


ing data through the efforts of his own unit. At dawn on 11 August, the train left Hsinasan for Shikukai, from which fire was opened at 0500 hours. The weather was fair, without wind. Primary targets were Soviet forward CP's and OP's; the range was 13,500 meters. A barrage was exchanged with the Russians for two hours, and 51 rounds were fired; but the enemy apparently could not detect the firing site of the Japanese train unit. Enemy shells fell 1,000 meters short, inflicting casualties on friendly ground units but not on the train itself. Col. Morita asked the artillery commander for firing-effect data, but Col. Tanaka was not in a position to comply. Later, however, the artillery colonel commended the armored train unit for its effective performance.

When the armor train unit commander was satisfied that his mission had been accomplished [the enemy had presumably ceased firing], he moved back to Hsinasan. En route, a dozen Soviet aircraft were sighted, on their way to attack Japanese positions. The train took shelter in a tunnel; although the Russian planes looped several times, they could not detect the railway guns.

The 2d Armored Train Unit was in Hsinasan when the cease-fire order was issued shortly afterwards [before noon on the 11th]. The weather now changed, and torrential rains fell, causing the Tumen to overflow; movements were greatly restricted. The Japanese continued to clear the battlefield and collect casualties; but the

FIGURE 10

MAKE-UP OF 2d ARMORED TRAIN UNIT  
CHANGKUFENG, AUG 38



Russians were busy encroaching onto Korean territory, crossing Changkufeng Hill and erecting wire entanglements.

After the floods abated, the 2d Armored Train Unit was ordered to leave Hsinasan. The train crossed the Korea-Manchukuo border on 25 November and returned to Harbin on the 30th.

The 24-cm. railway gun train unit at Hutou did not participate in the fighting at Changkufeng.

Secrecy was imperative throughout the course of the movements of the 2d Armored Train Unit, as the enemy espionage network was widespread. False information had to be given to the local inhabitants. Tactically speaking, complete surprise was absolutely necessary in effecting Japanese operations.

\*\*\*\*\*

The foregoing account by the commander of the 2d Armored Train Unit appears to brand as mendacious the version of Soviet Army witnesses at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. There it was asserted that during the fighting on 31 July "one heavy-caliber battery, mounted on an armored train, several times opened fire from the western bank of the Tumen, moving out of the tunnel."\* This would have transpired eleven days before the Japanese armored train unit arrived at the front; as we have seen, the

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\* Cross-examination of Maj. G. A. Batarshin, IMTFE, Transcript, 30 Oct 47, p. 32,105. - Ed.

railway guns fired only two hours on the very day of the ceasefire  
(11 August).

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